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The rising dispute over greater public access to the machinery of
international law features two rival camps, each raising a flag of de-
mocracy, and each claiming that the other threatens that flag. They
represent competing models of global governance. One camp sees a
vital constitutive role for non-state actors in lawmaking. The other
views states as exclusive and autonomous international protagonists.
Yet despite these polar positions, each claims the mantle of the "more
democratic." This Article joins the debate and examines international
summits as an emerging phenomenon that offers a potential bridge
between the two positions. Summit meetings of heads of state and
government are public forums where transboundary constituencies
engage state leaders even as those leaders engage one another. Law-
making, though only a ceremonial fraction of summit meetings them-
selves, is advanced by planning and implementing summit
commitments; in these interstices, non-state actors work to inform
outcomes and shape institutional agendas. This Article examines the
role of non-state actors in summits and asks whether they can be
viewed as contributors to the lawmaking process. The Article studies
inter-American summits as a case in point, focusing on efforts to ad-
vance a regional "democracy agenda" through the catalysis of the
summit process. Case studies include a U.S. proposal for a regional
public participation strategy, a Peruvian initiative to discourage and
respond to coups, and a Canadian measure to increase citizen access
to the region's chief political body. The Article shows that summits
facilitated these initiatives by providing a context for cooperative law-
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making in which non-state actors played a central role-a key concern
for public access proponents. Yet states initiated and managed the
process, and heads of state and government ultimately ratified the
outcomes, so the public role in shaping outcomes did not threaten
state authority-a key concern for access critics. In the debate over
the appropriate place for non-state actors in international lawmaking,
the author thus concludes that summits can advance the legitimacy
and democracy concerns that, at their core, appear to motivate the
competing positions. While summits are not a basis for lasting peace
between the camps, they can be seen as an emerging mechanism that
offers common ground.
A. The Debate Over Non-State Access
In the ongoing debate about mechanisms through which interna-
tional law is made and administered, a number of scholars have ar-
gued that non-state actors,' often acting within networks that include
subsidiary state agencies and inter-state institutions, have an impor-
tant jurisgenerative role. 2 Peter Haas, for example, has described epi-
stemic communities of scientific and policy experts that worked to
address problems such as the transboundary pollution of the Mediter-
ranean Sea 3 and threats to the ozone layer.4 Haas argues that these
communities act as "channels through which new ideas circulate from
1. The term "non-state actor" is used in this Article
in its broadest sense to include organizations, communities, groups, associations, insti-
tutions, and even individual actors (activists, scholars, or private sector entrepreneurs).
While there is a tendency to group such actors together under the heading "non-gov-
ernmental organization," "private voluntary organization," or "civil society organiza-
tion," the term "non-state actor" is used here for several reasons. It emphasizes
neutrality in terms of the ... actors' legal form, purpose, and/or objectives .... [Moreo-
ver], it focuses on an essential question in international law-the participation of actors
who are not state sovereigns in processes designed by and for states that have tradition-
ally been the province of states.
Eric Dannenmaier, A European Commitment to Environmental Citizenship: Article 3.7 of the
Aarhus Convention and Public Participation in International Forums, in 18 YEARBOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 32, 33 n.4 (Ole Kristian Fauchald et al. eds., 2007).
2. The question of what is jurisgenerative in international law is bound up in a broader theo-
retical debate about the nature of international law; the importance of processes that give shape
to positive legal commitments; and the significance of less formal instruments, institutions, and
networks. See generally THE METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Steven R. Ratner & Anne-
Marie Slaughter eds., 2005) (presenting a collection of articles previously published in the Amer-
ican Journal of International Law that explore alternative theoretical frameworks for interna-
tional law). These questions are explored in greater depth in Part V of this Article. See infra
notes 135-202 and accompanying text.
3. See Peter M. Haas, Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollu-
tion Control, 43 INT'L ORG. 377, 384-87 (1989). The term "epistemic communities" was earlier
offered by John Ruggie to describe the communities that form around common policy ideas. See
John Gerard Ruggie, International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends, 29 INT'L
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societies to governments as well as from country to country,"'5 and
that they are an important means to solve multilateral problems and
promote world order.6
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have described how non-state
actors work though transnational advocacy networks that "interact
with each other, with states, and with international organizations" to
"change the behavior of states and international organizations."' 7
Keck and Sikkink point to the growing influence of these networks,
which they portray as
[s]imultaneously principled and strategic actors, they "frame" issues
to make them comprehensible to target audiences, to attract atten-
tion and encourage action, and to "fit" with favorable institutional
venues. Network actors bring new ideas, norms, and discourses into
policy debates, and serve as sources of information and testimony.8
While these networks engage government officials in an expansive
policy community, 9 participants are frequently non-governmental, and
their agendas reflect the policy priorities of an even broader public.10
In a 2006 Centennial Anniversary article for the American Journal
of International Law, Steve Charnovitz traced the history and dis-
cussed the relevance of non-state actor contributions to international
ORG. 557, 569-70 (1975) (analogizing to what Michele Foucault referred to as "'epistemes,'
through which the political relationships" acted out on the international stage "are visualized").
4. See Peter M. Haas, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect
Stratospheric Ozone, 46 INT'L ORG. 187, 189-96 (1992).
5. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,
46 INT'L ORG. 1, 27 (1992).
6. See id. at 27-28; see also Emanuel Adler & Peter M. Haas, Conclusion: Epistemic Commu-
nities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program, 46 INT'L ORG. 367,
370-71 (1992) (describing the instrumental value of epistemic communities when promoting
greater international coordination and greater affinity between the values and practices of states
and the policies advanced through international regimes and institutions).
7. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 1-2 (1998).
8. Id. at 2-3.
9. See id. at 31. The term "government officials" is used in this Article in a broad sense to
encompass a range of senior, mid-level, and junior diplomats and bureaucrats (at each level
including career employees as well as political appointees), not just senior officials who may be
answering directly to a head of state.
10. Id. at 7-8. Networks comprised principally of governmental officials are also actively en-
gaged in defining international priorities and shaping law outside of the traditional structure and
formal hierarchies of foreign ministries. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have described
"transgovernmental" activity "among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled
or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments." Rob-
ert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,
27 WORLD POL. 39, 43 (1974). Anne-Marie Slaughter has detailed how these "[n]etworks of
government officials-police investigators, financial regulators, even judges and legislators-in-
creasingly exchange information and coordinate activity to ... address common problems on a
global scale." ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 1 (2004).
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lawmaking.11 He concentrated on the participation of non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs)12-a dominant species of non-state ac-
tor-and argued that they "promote accountability by monitoring
what government delegates say and do," and that they "communicate
that information to elected officials and the public. ' 13 NGOs, he
noted, "help assure that decision makers are aware of the sympathies
and interests of the people who will be affected by intergovernmental
decisions."'1 4 These scholars and others make the case that non-state
actors have an increasingly important affirmative role in international
governance.1 5 They also highlight the normative value and instrumen-
tal advantage of an engaged public, and they are sympathetic to, and
often proponents of, increasing access to the processes they describe.1 6
Others contest this scholarship and reject its normative implica-
tions. They hold to a more traditional Westphalian idea of interna-
tional lawmaking that is reserved to autonomous and insular
11. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law,
100 Am. J. INT'L L. 348 (2006) [hereinafter Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations].
Charnovitz has also authored an earlier, more extensive catalogue of non-state actor participa-
tion. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International
Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183 (1997) [hereinafter Charnovitz, Participation].
12. Much of the literature on non-state actors deals with non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), sometimes consciously distinguished from other actors-universities, think tanks, busi-
ness groups, individuals, and for-profit organizations-and sometimes not. As discussed above,
this Article is concerned with the broader universe of non-state actors. See supra note 1 and
accompanying text. Yet NGOs are an important class of non-state actor, and they are frequent
protagonists and thus frequently studied, so literature about NGOs is both abundant and rele-
vant to the broader inquiry.
13. Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations, supra note 11, at 367.
14. Id.
15. See generally, e.g., Menno T. Kamminga, The Evolving Status of NGOs Under Interna-
tional Law: A Threat to the Inter-State System?, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
93-111 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) (examining the legal capacity of NGOs to behave as states do in
international law and concluding that there is "much more reason for concern about the negative
impact of 'irresponsible' governments than about 'irresponsible NGOs"'); Eric Dannenmaier,
Trade, Democracy, and the FTAA: Public Access to the Process of Constructing a Free Trade Area
of the Americas, 27 FOROHAM INT'L L.J. 1066, 1115 (2004) (describing a process through which
non-state actors engaged negotiators of a regional trade accord in dialogue regarding societal
priorities in areas such as the environment, labor, and combating corruption, and concluding that
"the principles of participation far outweigh the principles of secrecy when multilateral [trade]
policies are [ultimately] applied at the national level"); David Wirth, Public Participation in In-
ternational Processes: Environmental Case Studies at the National and International Levels, 7
COLO. J. Irr'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 38 (1996) (analyzing competing policies of openness and
secrecy in international environmental and public health matters, and concluding that rules of
limited access at the international level can undermine the legitimacy of government at the na-
tional level in those cases in which "international institutions are vehicles for domestic policy
making in the first instance").
16. See Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations, supra note 11, at 368-72; David B.
Hunter, Civil Society Networks and the Development of Environmental Standards at International
Financial Institutions, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 437, 456-57 (2008).
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sovereign states. Former Interim Permanent Representative of the
United States to the United Nations John Bolton17 is a prominent
critic of an international governance role for civil society.18 Similarly,
Kenneth Anderson has decried the threat that non-state actors, princi-
pally international NGOs, pose to "the sovereignty of democratic
states."' 19 Bolton, Anderson, and other critics reject transnational col-
laboration outside traditional diplomatic channels as an unaccounta-
ble, illegitimate, and even undemocratic threat to vital conceptions of
sovereignty.20 One key metaphor that Bolton uses when challenging
non-state access to international process is a claim that this access pro-
17. Bolton was appointed by President George W. Bush in a recess appointment after Bolton
failed to receive confirmation from the Senate, and he served from August 2005 until December
2006. He resigned when his recess appointment would have ended. See Helene Cooper, Bush
Drops Bid to Keep Bolton as UN Envoy, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 5, 2006, at 1.
18. See generally John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 205, 215-218 (2000) [hereinafter Bolton, Global Governance] (arguing that allowing
civil society's "intrastate advocates to reargue their positions" in international forums "raises
profoundly troubling questions of democratic theory that its advocates have almost entirely
elided"); John R. Bolton, Is There Really "Law" in International Affairs?, 10 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 30-31 (2000) [hereinafter Bolton, Is There Really Law] (questioning the
conceptual legitimacy of "international 'civil society"' because it is a "collection of advocacy
NGOs" that are "far different" from the "associations that make up domestic 'civil society"' and
challenging the tactics of international NGOs that operate outside of "democratic polities where
they have been unsuccessful politically").
19. Kenneth Anderson, The Limits of Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy: Unsolicited
Advice to the Bush Administration on Relations with International Nongovernmental Organiza-
tions, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 371, 372 (2001); see also Kenneth Anderson & David Rieff, 'Global Civil
Society': A Sceptical View, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 26, 37 (Helmut Anheier et al. eds., 2005)
(the authors "argue that the 'democracy deficit' of the international system is buttressed rather
than challenged by the global civil society movement").
20. See Bolton, Is There Really Law, supra note 18, at 30-31 ("What actually seems to be
happening is that the international NGOs are becoming an alternative to national governments
as vehicles for decision-making. In reality, however, it is precisely the detachment from govern-
ments that makes such a 'civil society' so troubling, at least for democracies."); Anderson &
Rieff, supra note 19, at 37; The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Advi-
sory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge Gilbert Guillaume, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 216, 287-88 (July
8) (suggesting that the I.C.J. "could have considered declining to respond to the request for an
advisory opinion" because the request from the U.N. General Assembly "originated in a cam-
paign conducted by" NGOs, criticizing the "pressure brought to bear" by NGOs, and expressing
concern over the continued "independence" of governments and intergovernmental institutions
in the face of this pressure); Serge Surs, Vers Une Cour. P~nale Internationale: La Convention de
Rome entre les ONG et le Conseil de. Sgcurit6, 103 R.G.D.I.P. 29, 35-36 (expressing concern over
the "excessive NGO role" at the 1998 Rome Conference that created the International Criminal
Court). In the context of a broader claim about the "problem" that international law is undemo-
cratic, Jed Rubenfeld echoes the concerns of many access critics when he argues that
[i]n the last ten years or so, it became common for internationalists to reply to this
problem by pointing to the growing influence of non-governmental organizations
(NGO) in international law circles, as if these equally unaccountable, self-appointed,
unrepresentative NGOs somehow exemplified world public opinion, and as if the an-
tidemocratic nature of international governance were a kind of small accountability
hole that these NGOs could plug.
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vides a "second bite at the apple. ' 21 Presumably, Bolton means that
citizens are provided sufficient domestic access to the formulation of
foreign policy, and they should thus leave the table sated, when he
asserts that "[clivil society's 'second bite at the apple' raises pro-
foundly troubling questions of democratic theory that its advocates
have almost entirely elided."'22 A metaphor that portrays democratic
discourse as a perishable and finite comestible that is diminished (con-
sumed) rather than strengthened by its participants seems even more
profoundly troubling, but an explanation is entirely elided.
While it may seem ironic to charge that making international law
more participatory will actually make it less democratic these are nev-
ertheless the terms in which some see the issue. The debate has be-
come more heated as non-state access and the role of NGOs have
grown, and it touches on a central problem in international law: the
advancement of means for cooperative-and, when needed, coer-
cive-global governance in a system of autonomous sovereign states.
State-centrism is, for now at least, the system we have. A pragmatist
must admit wide latitude to the sovereign prerogative and anticipate
its forceful defense. But this Article argues that such latitude should
not be seen to irretrievably foreclose the potential of non-state actors
to inform, shape, and police international law. Their access to deci-
sion-making process is not an assault on state autonomy. In many
cases, non-state actors may play a role in lawmaking that access pro-
ponents find vital, without threatening the legitimacy and democracy
values that they share in common with access critics.
B. Summits as an Entry Point
This Article examines one such case. It explores an emerging phe-
nomenon in international relations-international summits23-that
may serve as a bridging mechanism between the two positions, at least
when certain process features are present. Unlike traditional diplo-
matic discourse, which is often sequestered and problem-specific,
Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2018 (2004) (foot-
note omitted); see also Jeremy Rabkin, International Law vs. the American Constitution, 55
NAT'L INT. 30, 37 (1999) ("NGOs never have to face voters or bear any sort of accountability.").
21. Bolton, Global Governance, supra note 18, at 217.
22. Id.
23. Heads of state and government are called by diverse names-prime minister, emir, king,
and president, for example-as are meetings among them. This Article will use the terms "inter-
national summit" and "summit" to refer to a forum of heads of state from more than two coun-
tries who are meeting to discuss common interests in regional, economic, or security matters.
This definition excludes ad hoc meetings that may take place from time to time to address this




summits convene national leaders on a highly public stage in a trans-
parent and frequently expansive policy dialogue. Summit agendas
cover a broad range of technical and policy issues that are coopera-
tively developed by specialized subsidiary state agencies that are capa-
ble of working across borders in collaboration with inter-state and
non-state actors.
This Article argues that summits may be fertile ground for the sort
of productive non-state input described by Charnovitz, Kamminga,
Wirth, and others,24 while operating within the context of trans-
boundary networks such as those described by Haas, Keck, and Sik-
kink, among others.25 Yet summits ultimately direct this cooperation
and input through participating states' chief political authorities in a
way that responds to the state-centered critique that is advanced by
access critics such as Bolton and Anderson.26 While non-state actors
operate through transboundary networks to inform and shape out-
comes, ministries and executive offices that are directly accountable to
the state's principal political authority still review and approve final
policy declarations and action plans. Heads of state and government
must ultimately sign the commitments that must be ratified (in the
case of formal obligations) or at least implemented (in the case of less
formal promises) by domestic institutions of government.
Having helped to shape and advance specific outcomes, trans-
boundary networks are positioned and motivated to support imple-
mentation, and this strengthens outcome legitimacy 27 and increases
the likelihood of compliance, 28 both of which are important instru-
24. See Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations, supra note 11; Kamnminga, supra note
15; Wirth, supra note 15; Dannenmaier, supra note 15.
25. See Haas, supra notes 3, 5; KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 7.
26. See Bolton, Global Governance, supra note 18; Bolton, Is There Really Law, supra note
18; Anderson, supra note 19.
27. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990)
[hereinafter FRANCK, LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS] (arguing that nations are more likely to
obey laws with a high degree of perceived legitimacy, and that legitimacy is reinforced by ele-
ments of "determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence"); Thomas M. Franck,
The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power
Disequilibrium, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 88, 94 (2006) [hereinafter Franck, Legitimacy of Power] (ar-
guing that "determinacy," or "that which makes [the rule's] message clear or transparent" is
perhaps the most important of these legitimacy-reinforcing elements). Engaging non-state ac-
tors in international processes not only increases process transparency and the clarity of out-
comes but also better positions non-state actors to support adherence in a domestic context. See
also infra Part VII (arguing that engaging non-state actors in the summit process has increased
the jurisgenerative potential of summits).
28. See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) (advancing a "manage-
rial" model of treaty compliance that relies on a continuing dialogue between the parties, inter-
national officials, and NGOs); see also infra notes 309-310 and accompanying text (describing
2009]
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mental contributions to the process of international lawmaking. Par-
ticipation by non-state actors also offers the normative value
associated with deliberative democracy, such as promoting practices
of mutual respect and encouraging public spiritedness. 29 Yet state
commitment and state resources remain essential to fulfilling promises
that are made through the summit process.
In recent years, international summits have advanced substantially
in profile as well as productivity, though they remain largely unstudied
outside the circle of diplomats and specialists who manage their
processes. Although ad hoc high level meetings abound, this Article is
concerned with periodic and "institutionalized" summits where an it-
erative planning process drives outcomes, and where these outcomes
rely on institutions or institutional features for implementation.30 This
Article studies the inter-American summit process as a case in point,
focusing on efforts to strengthen democratic practices and institutions
among Organization of American States (OAS) member states over
the past decade. It finds that the inter-American process features a
relatively flexible and inclusive mechanism through which epistemic
communities-usually loose coalitions of state and non-state actors-
have made modest but measurable progress in advancing this regional
policy agenda. 31 In each case, inter-American summits provided a
platform for states and inter-state networks to negotiate interests and
shape regional approaches. And in each case, the outcomes were
overseen by officials reporting to heads of state, and the outcomes
themselves were ultimately endorsed by heads of state. 32 In fact, it is
often difficult to separate the agendas of state officials from those of
the propensity of summits to "promote conforming behavior" among state institutions and to
place societal actors in a position to monitor implementation).
29. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 10-12
(2004) (arguing that mutual respect and public spiritedness are important in dealing with moral
disagreement that can otherwise undermine legitimacy in governance); see also infra notes
306-308 and accompanying text (summarizing how summits engage interested parties, including
vocal dissidents, in dialogue and consensus building); infra notes 325-329 and accompanying text
(describing summits' reliance on cooperative models and the potential of summits to change the
context of interaction within regional policy institutions).
30. For examples of nineteen global and regional summits that were organized around social,
economic, or security interests, see infra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
31. See infra Part IV-V.
32. Formal summit outcomes, in the form of declarations and plans of action, are typically
signed by the heads of state and government who participate in the summit meetings. The ex-
ception is the most recent summit in Trinidad in April 2009, where a consensus document was




non-state actors, at least as negotiated through and transformed by
the deliberative process. 33
Although most inter-American summit "commitments" are not, in
and of themselves, binding law in a positivist sense, 34 the process has a
normative push that can drive more formal commitments. 35 Summit
agreements frame the agenda for key institutional actors and stimu-
late negotiations over details-such as trade agreements36-that en-
courage prescriptive adaptation. Moreover, summits can engage a
broad spectrum of non-state actors and address wide-ranging social
concerns-including the environment, human rights, gender discrimi-
nation, indigenous rights, and trade-in a dynamic and transparent
way that may strengthen the legitimacy of summit outcomes and re-
lated regional projects.37 As a consequence, inter-American summits
33. This outcome is seen as a positive feature of deliberative democracy, which seeks to com-
bine preferences "in various ways that are efficient and fair" through a process that "tells citizens
and their representatives to... reason together." GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 29, at 13,
20.
34. Even calling summit statements "commitments" might be contested, although that is the
term commonly used among negotiators and bureaucrats when describing the imperative lan-
guage of summit documents. Inter-American summit documents are variously called "declara-
tions" or "plans of action," and the text is usually couched in terms that state the signatories
"will" accomplish a set of aims, which can vary from statements of principle to concrete pro-
grams. See, e.g., Third Summit of the Americas, Quebec City, Can., Apr. 22, 2001, Plan of Ac-
tion [hereinafter Quebec Plan of Action], at 1, available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/59664.
htm ("[Will] recogniz[e] the relationship among democracy, sustainable development [and] the
separation of powers"); id. at 6 ("[Will] establish an inter-American program within the OAS for
the promotion and protection of the human rights of migrants"). It could be argued that decla-
rations by heads of state in a summit context create international legal obligations under some
circumstances. See, e.g., Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 43 (Dec. 20) (noting
that even unilateral declarations of heads of state "concerning legal or factual situations may
have the effect of creating legal obligations" where there is an "intent to be bound"); see also
Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon
v. Nig.), 2002 I.C.J. 303 1 262-63 (Oct. 10) (finding that a bilateral declaration of heads of state
concerning a maritime boundary is "governed by international law and constitutes a treaty in the
sense of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties"). But it is beyond the scope of this
Article to examine whether any of the International American summit declarations, which aspire
more than they commit, are legally binding in this sense. Instead, the word "commitment" will
be used in this Article not to imply a binding legal obligation, but for ease of reference to provi-
sions of summit documents.
35. Summit commitments can be seen as advancing the lawmaking process and, by some theo-
rists, as a type of soft law. There are some summit outcomes that can be seen as positive law.
See discussion infra Part VII.
36. Negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas, for example, were called for in the
Miami Summit. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
37. Legitimacy in outcome and process may be viewed in different ways, but here I use the
term legitimacy in the sense that Thomas Franck has described as "the capacity of a rule to pull
those to whom it is addressed toward consensual compliance." Franck, Legitimacy of Power,
supra note 27, at 93. The case studies presented in this Article suggest that inter-American
summit commitments are reached through a process that values transparency and public access
in a way that satisfies common normative concerns of national constituencies that are concerned
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have strong jurisgenerative potential, and the public process through
which summit agendas are developed serves to strengthen that poten-
tial.38 Moreover, because summits feature transparency, openness,
and inclusive agenda setting that emphasizes collaboration among
states and their domestic constituencies, outcomes are more likely to
be drawn into domestic legal agendas through transboundary legal
process mechanisms such as those described by transboundary process
theorists.39 Evidence of this is found in domestic legislation that di-
rectly reflects summit commitments, in state behavioral adaptations,
and in those instances when states commit funds and institutional re-
sources to implement summit promises.4 0 Even the tension and dis-
cord in evidence at the most recent summit in Trinidad and Tobago 4'
suggest that there is a very real connection between summit outcomes
and domestic concerns. The unwillingness of some leaders to embrace
summit promises that are inconsistent with domestic priorities, and
the strong rhetorical connection between regional and domestic dis-
courses, are as indicative of the potential power of the summit process
as they are of the fractious state of regional politics.
This Article concludes that, by embracing transparent and par-
ticipatory process features, inter-American summits have produced a
mutually reinforcing phenomenon: the jurisgenerative potential of
summits increases as public access to the insular world of international
decision making expands. 42 Where these features are present, sum-
mits can, in a sense, "democratize" without being antidemocratic.
They might thus be seen as mechanisms that can bridge the distance
between those who embrace transboundary networks and those who
fear that they overreach, which is perhaps one step in the direction of
reconciling an important theoretical divide.
Part II describes international summits as an emerging institutional
phenomenon.4 3 It offers a partial catalogue of summits that have be-
come regularized opportunities for heads of state to meet and affirm
with the subject matter of summits. This does not suggest that the process is ideal or could not
stand improvement, but it does help strengthen the legitimacy of summit outcomes as interna-
tional legal norms. See also David Estlund, Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic
Dimension of Democratic Authority, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND
POLITICS 173, 173-74 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997) (outcome legitimacy derives
in part "from the epistemic value ... of the procedure that has produced it.").
38. See infra notes 302-329 and accompanying text.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See infra notes 128-134 and accompanying text.
42. See infra Part VIII.
43. See infra notes 58-62, 67-85 and accompanying text.
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commitments to broad policy goals that can then be carried forward
by state-bound institutions.
Part III explores the history of inter-American summits in particu-
lar, offering a brief background on how these regional meetings have
emerged since the first contemporary Summit of the Americas in
Miami in 1994 to create cooperative networks, shape institutional
agendas, promote normative solutions, and facilitate monitoring and
compliance .44
Part IV reviews non-state actor access to inter-American summit
preparations, including the formulation of summit commitments and
mandates. 45 It examines the unique process features that allow non-
state actors to become engaged with foreign ministries and expert
government agencies so that policy priorities are not discussed in a
vacuum. Policy actors in the Inter-American System, both state and
non-state, have taken advantage of these unique features to advance
policy and normative goals through a process that is deliberative, and
thus more democratic from an access proponent perspective, yet
never outside the oversight or control of states, and thus no less demo-
cratic from an access critic perspective. The institutionalization of
participatory norms within the inter-American summit has reinforced
two types of summit outcomes. The first is a largely hortatory call for
greater democracy within the region.46 The second is a series of com-
mitments to reform regional institutions in order to make them more
democratic, as well as to support and defend elected governments
through those regional institutions.47
Part V addresses the first and more general of these two out-
comes.48 It examines inter-American summit commitments to pro-
moting principles of democratic governance and public participation
at a regional and national level. This Part traces the language of inter-
American summit agreements from 1994 to present that promote re-
gional efforts to advance a "democracy" agenda among OAS member
states.49 It also outlines commitments to greater participation in de-
velopment decision making, both among and within OAS member
states, along with prescriptive and institutional advances relating to
these commitments. 50
44. See infra notes 86-102 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 103-134 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 135-202 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 203-301 and accompanying text.





Part VI addresses specific summit outcomes. It presents four case
studies of democratic commitments that emerged from the inter-
American summit process: (1) the formulation of the Inter-American
Strategy for the Promotion of Public Participation in Sustainable De-
velopment Decision-Making (ISP), which addressed public participa-
tion at the regional and national level;51 (2) the development of an
Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC), which would in part dis-
courage internal extra-constitutional challenges to elected govern-
ments;52 (3) the increase in openness and transparency of negotiations
to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA);53 and (4) the
engagement of non-state actors in the OAS through a program of ac-
creditation. 54 Each example shows state leaders working alongside
non-state actors to shape and advance a specific lawmaking goal. 55
Part VII discusses the jurisgenerative potential of inter-American
summits in light of the outcomes discussed in the prior two Parts.56
Inter-American summits have placed lawmaking and implementation
in a more transparent institutional and procedural context, and they
have opened the process in a way that introduces important delibera-
tive features. While this Article shows some cases in which the sum-
mit process has had a discernable impact on positive law that emerged
from the inter-American system, it does not claim a linear or direct
causal connection between summit outcomes and prescriptive com-
mitments. Instead, it argues that the process through which inter-
American summits are managed and executed has a role in substanti-
ating normative claims and shaping positive legal frameworks. This
Article does not directly enter the debate over the nature of interna-
tional law and the importance of soft law and legal process versus pos-
itive law, but the phenomenon it describes is certainly relevant to that
debate. Even if summit outcomes are not understood as law, they
should be understood as part of lawmaking, and the inclusionary or
exclusionary manner in which these outcomes are formulated matters.
Part VIII concludes that a participatory and institutionalized inter-
American summit process has served a mutually reinforcing function:
increasing the legitimacy and prescriptive potential of summits even
while providing a vehicle for bringing the concerns and agendas of
non-state actors closer to the process and institutions of international
51. See infra notes 209-226 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 227-256 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 257-277 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 278-301 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 209-301 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 302-329 and accompanying text.
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law. 57 The format and impact of summits vary widely, and no claim is
made that the inter-American summit process represents a universal
model. Summits do, however, possess the common dimension that
they periodically convene heads of state on a public stage to address
issues of public concern. The summits with which this Article is con-
cerned also have an institutionalized multilateral framework within
which those issues are discussed and outcomes are derived. To the
extent that summits possess or may come to possess the key features
explored in this Article, they offer a mechanism for engaging non-
state actors that can satisfy divergent claims about how to advance
democratic ideals through international process.
11. THE SUMMIT PHENOMENON
International summits are an important, although under studied,
post-World War II institutional trend that has grown in scope and im-
pact in the post-Soviet era. As more commonly studied international
institutions such as the United Nations and the World Bank have ma-
tured, at least twenty-one global and regional head of state forums
have also evolved;58 a few have been singular events, but most are
planned and held on an annual or biennial basis. Summits address
issues ranging from global concerns (such as climate change, human
rights, and terrorism) to parochial concerns (such as trade and eco-
nomic integration) to local concerns (such as Indonesian forest fires
and the need to promote women to positions of authority in African
states). While summits fulfill the public diplomacy role of providing a
world stage to national leaders, their substantive impact should not be
discounted. Summits provided a context and platform for the forma-
tion of the Organization for African Unity,59 helped to advance the
formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (the 1955 Asian-African
Conference), 60 provided a platform for concluding the Convention on
57. See infra Part VIII.
58. This count includes the following: seventeen continuing forums, each of which has in-
cluded dozens of separate summit meetings; three stand-alone forums, namely the 2005 U.N.
Summit, the 1992 and 2002 Sustainable Development Summits, and the 1955 and 2005 Asian-
African Summits; and one new forum that was inaugurated in 2005, the East Asian States Sum-
mit. See infra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
59. Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, 479 U.N.T.S. 39 (signed May 25, 1963; en-
tered into force Sept. 13, 1963) (signed by "the Heads of African States and Governments as-
sembled in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia").
60. See GEORGE McTURNAN KAHIN, THE ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE: BANDUNG, INDO-
NESIA, APRIL 1955 (1956) (describing from a journalistic perspective the meeting of leaders from
twenty-nine Asian and African countries and reproducing key speeches and final agreements).
The Final Communiqu6 from Bandung included provisions for economic and cultural coopera-
tion, the promotion of human rights and self determination, and the promotion of peace and
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Biological Diversity and Framework Convention on Climate Change
in 1992 (concluded at The United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development or "Earth Summit"), 61 and almost offered an
opportunity for exile to Saddam Hussein a few weeks before the U.S.
invasion of Iraq in 2003 (occurring at the Arab League Summit). 62
As the power and legitimacy of international law are debated in a
newly multi-polar international political context, the emergence of
summits appears to have been underappreciated, or at least under
studied. Efforts to construct a "new world order, ' 63 to deconstruct
global administrative law,64 and to seek greater democratic access to
international decision making 65 might each benefit from a close study
of the phenomenon of summits. Summits might not currently be
viewed as formal international institutions, but as they become institu-
tionalized and begin to shape institutional agendas, they might offer
an opportunity to meet the concerns of those who wish to see interna-
tional law become more democratic.
The following table of recent regional and global summits provides
an idea of the extent of the summit phenomenon. While these meet-
ings do not all share the same process features as the inter-American
summits, they fit the basic definition of periodic meetings of heads of
state and government.66 Although this Article focuses only on the in-
security cooperation. Id. at 76-85. Participants created a basis for continuing cooperation
through a commitment to appoint "Liaison Officers ... for the exchange of information on
matters of mutual interest." Id. at 78. Participants also signed a Declaration on the Promotion
of World Peace and Cooperation that called for "respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty
of all nations," abstention from aggression, abstention from interference in domestic affairs,
"equality of all races and nations," peaceful dispute settlement, and "promotion of mutual inter-
ests and cooperation." Id. at 83-85.
61. See SHANNA L. HALPERN, ACADEMIC COUNCIL FOR THE UN Sys., THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: PROCESS AND DOCUMENTATION, at 12
(1992), available at http://www.ciesin.org/docs/008-585/unced-home.html (last visited July 30,
2009).
62. In the days before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, then-President George W. Bush
announced, "Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do
so will result in military conflict." CNN reported that there were
some private maneuverings among some Arab leaders to try to forestall the U.S. inva-
sion.... [R]oughly three weeks before the first U.S. strike, Saddam Hussein agreed in
principle to accept an offer of exile. The offer came from the United Arab Emirates
and was presented to other Arab leaders during a summit of the Arab League in Egypt.
The proposal ... was never acted upon.
The Situation Room (CNN television broadcast Nov. 2, 2005), available at http://transcripts.
cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0511/02/sitroom.03.html (last visited July 30, 2009).
63. SLAUGHTER, supra note 10, at 15-17.
64. See Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administra-
tive Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1495, 1561-62 (2006).
65. See Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations, supra note 11, at 368-72.
66. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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ter-American process, these other meetings might also warrant study
as they become increasingly institutionalized international forums.
TABLE 1: PARTIAL CATALOGUE OF RECENT SUMMITS
1. Andean Community (ANCOM) (17th) Tarija, Bolivia 200767
2. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (16th) Singapore
200968
3. Arab League (20th) Damascus, Syria 200869
4. Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (14th)
Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand 200970
5. Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) (7th) Beijing, China 200871
6. Asian-African Summit (2nd) Jakarta, Indonesia 2005 (50th an-
niversary of first)72
7. African Union (AU) (13th) Sirt, Libya 200973
8. European Union (EU) Brussels, Belgium 200974
9. Group of Eight (G-8) L'Aquila, Italy 200975
10. Group of Twenty (G-20) London, United Kingdom 200976
67. Declaration of Tarija: Seventeenth Regular Meeting of the Andean Council of Presidents,
Tarija, Bol., June 14, 2007, http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/documentos/documents/
tarija.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
68. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Peru and APEC, http://www.apec2008.org.pe/apec
peruandapec.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
69. The 2008 Arab League Summit, http://www.middleeastprogress.org/2008/03/the-2008-
arab-league-summit! (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
70. 14th ASEAN Summit, Cha-am Hua Hin, Thail., Feb. 28-Mar. 1, 2009, Chairman's State-
ment of the 14th ASEAN Summit: "ASEAN Charter for ASEAN Peoples", http://aseansec.org/
22328.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
71. Asia-Europe Meeting, ASEM Summits: Overview, http://www.aseminfoboard.org/page.
phtml?code=summits# (last visited July 30, 2009).
72. This second Asian-African Summit was held fifty years after the inaugural edition. See
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Asian-African Summit 2005 and the Commemoration of
the Golden Jubilee of the Asian-African Conference 1955, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/an
nounce/2005/4/041 9 .html (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
73. African Union, Summit 2009 Sirt-Libya, http://foreign.gov.ly/online/ausummit2009/en/
(last visited June 27, 2009).
74. Brussels European Council, Brussels, Belg., June 18-19, 2009, Presidency Conclusions
(June 19, 2009), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms-data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/108622.
pdf (last visited July 30, 2009).
75. G-8 Summit 2009, http://www.g8italia2009.it/G8/Home/G8-G8-Layout-locale-119988
2116809_Home.htm (last visited July 30, 2009).
76. The London Summit, Apr. 2, 2009, Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, http://www.
londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/PDF/final-communique (last visited July 30, 2009). Note that
the G-20, formally known as the "Group of Twenty (G-20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors," traces its history to 1999 and claims that its purpose is "to bring together systemi-
cally important industrialized and developing economies to discuss key issues in the global econ-
omy." g-20.org, What Is the G-20, http://www.g20.org/about-what-is-g20.aspx (last visited Sept.
12, 2009). The G-20 has only met twice at the head of state and government level.
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11. Inter-American Summit (5th) Port of Spain, Trinidad and To-
bago 200977
12. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Strasbourg,
France and Kehl, Germany 200978
13. Non-Aligned Movement (15th) Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt79
14. Rio Group (20th) Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic
200880
15. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
(15th) Colombo, Sri Lanka 200881
16. Southern African Development Community (SADC) (28th)
Johannesburg, South Africa 200882
17. Central American Integration System (SICA) (34th) Mana-
gua, Nicaragua 200983
18. United Nations (UN) New York, United States 200584
19. World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) Johan-
nesburg, South Africa 200285
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTER-AMERICAN SUMMITS
In 1994, presidents and heads of state from thirty-four of the thirty-
five Western Hemisphere states met in Miami for the First Summit of
the Americas. 86 In fact, it was the third meeting of heads of state in
77. The Inter-American Summit is affiliated with the OAS. The Fifth Summit of the Ameri-
cas was held in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, June 17-19, 2009. See http://www.summit-
americas.org/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
78. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Summit Meetings of Heads of State and Govern-
ment, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2009/0904-summit/index.html (last visited July 30, 2009).
79. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt, XV Summit of the non-Aligned Movement, http://
www.namegypt.org/en/pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2009).
80. Twentieth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Rio Group, Santo Domingo,
Dom. Rep., Mar. 7, 2008, Santo Domingo Declaration, http://www.minfor.gov.gy/tsite/images/
minfordocs/rio-group/2008/santo-domingo declaration.pdf (last visited Jul 30, 2009).
81. Fifteenth South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation Summit, Colombo, Sri Lanka,
Aug. 2-3, 2008, Declaration: Partnership for Growth for Our People, http://www.saarc-sec.org/
data/summitl5/summitl5declaration.htm (last visited July 30, 2009). The Sixteenth Summit of
the SAARC will be held in the Republic of Maldives. Id.
82. Dr. Tomaz Augusto Salom~o, Southern African Development Community Executive Sec-
retary, Address on the Occasion of the Pre-Summit Diplomats Briefing (Aug. 5, 2008), available
at http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/96 (last visited July 30, 2009).
83. Sistema de la Integraci6n Centroamericana (SICA) (Central American Integration Sys-
tem), Regional Summits, http://www.sica.int/busqueda/Reuniones%20Grupo%20de%2OAuto
ridades.aspx?IDItem=37556&IDCat=9&IdEnt=401&Idm=1&IdmStyle=2 (last visited Nov. 5,
2009).
84. United Nations, The 2005 World Summit, http://www.un.org/summit2005/ (last visited July
30, 2009).
85. The latest edition of this summit is a follow up to the 1992 UN Conference on Environ-
ment and Development, or "Earth Summit." World Summit on Sustainable Development,
Background and Resources, http://www.bccaorg/ief/wssd.htm (last visited July 30, 2009).
86. Cuba is the only state in the Western Hemisphere that does not participate in inter-Ameri-
can summits. Cuba remains a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), but was
prevented from taking its seat in the OAS General Assembly pursuant to a 1962 resolution,
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the Americas following the Second World War. Although prior meet-
ings had convened in 1956 and 1967,87 the third meeting was consid-
ered the first meeting of the modern era, and it has launched a series
of meetings that has been perpetuated to this date. Depending on
how one counts, there have been either five or seven inter-American
summits since 1994. Five formal, or numbered, summits88 have taken
which declared that "the present Government of Cuba has voluntarily placed itself outside the
inter-American system." Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, Punta Del Este,
Uru., Final Act, at 14, OAS Doe. OEA/Ser.F/II.8, doc. 68, (Jan. 22-31, 1962), available at http:/l
www.oas.orglconsejo/meetings%200F%20consultation/actas/acta%208.pdf (last visited Aug. 2,
2009) [hereinafter 1962 Cuba Exclusion Resolution]. The relevant part of that resolution reads,
1. That adherence by any member of the Organization of American States to Marx-
ism-Leninism is incompatible with the inter-American system and the alignment of
such a government with the communist block breaks the unity and solidarity of the
hemisphere.
2. That the present Government of Cuba, which has officially identified itself as a
Marxist-Leninist government, is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the
inter-American system.
3. That this incompatibility excludes the present Government of Cuba from partici-
pation in the inter-American system.
Id. Until 2009, Cuba's non grata status in the General Assembly and within OAS organs left it
presumptively excluded from regional activities held under OAS auspices, and the OAS is a core
institutional sponsor of inter-American summits. Cuba's status changed in June 2009 when the
OAS adopted a resolution at its 39th General Assembly in Honduras rescinding the 1962 Cuba
Exclusion Resolution. See AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09) OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.5006/09 rev. 1
(Sept. 29, 2009), 1, available at http://scm.oas.org/doc-public/ENGLISH/HIST_09/AGO4
689E10.DOC (last visited Nov. 6, 2009). The 2009 Resolution states that Cuba's participation in
the OAS going forward "will be the result of a process of dialogue initiated at the request of the
Government of Cuba, and in accordance with the practices, purposes, and principles of the
OAS." Id. $ 2. This means that a key formal barrier to Cuba's return to the regional political
system, and thus the inter-American summit process, has been removed. But the actual return
of Cuba would require a petition from its government along with commitments to reform politi-
cal and economic policies to accord with the OAS charter and other basic documents. Cuba's
initial response to the resolution has been to reject the idea of rejoining what its official govern-
ment newspaper, Granma, calls the "graveless cadaver" of the OAS. Frances Robles, Cuba Says
It Won't Join OAS, SUN-SENTINAL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 9, 2009, at 9A.
87. See Richard E. Feinberg, The Summit of the Americas: An Architecture for Inter-Ameri-
can Relations, Address Before the Inter-American Dialogue (Sept. 20, 1994), in ADVANCING
THE MIAMI PROCESS: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS 41, 42 (Robin Rosen-
berg & Steve Stein eds., 1995). At the time of his address Feinberg was Special Assistant to the
President of the United States and Senior Director for Inter-American Affairs on the National
Security Council. Id. at 41; see also Org. of Am. States, Declaration of the Presidents of the
American Republics in Panama (July 22, 1956), available at http://www.summit-americas.org/
declarat%20presidents-panama%201956-eng.htm (last visited July 30, 2009) (discussing the his-
tory of Western Hemisphere Summits); Org. of Am. States, Declaration of the Presidents of the
Americas, Meeting of American Chiefs of State (April 14, 1967), available at http://www.summit-
americas.org/declaratpresidents-1967-eng.htm (last visited July 30, 2009) (describing the out-
come of the 1967 Summit); Summit of the Americas Information Network, the Summit Process,
http://www.summit-americas.org/eng/summitprocess.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2009) (providing
history of Western Hemisphere summits provided by the OAS through its summit web site).
88. The titles of these summits are preceded by ordinal numbers-for example, first, second,
and so on-in official documents.
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place, the most recent in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, in April
2009,89 along with two special, or thematic, summits: a Summit on Sus-
tainable Development in Santa Cruz, Bolivia in 1996,90 and a Special
Summit in Monterrey, Mexico in 2004.91
The confusion over numbering the meetings speaks in part to the
relatively ad hoc-one might say flexible-and evolving structure for
summit planning in the Western Hemisphere. In 1996, the Santa Cruz
Summit, second in time (1996), dealt specifically with issues of sustain-
able development. For a range of reasons-some perhaps owing to
the desire of governments not to elevate the theme too highly-Santa
Cruz was not granted an ordinal number and remains known as the
"sustainable development summit" rather than the "second sum-
mit. '' 92 Similarly, although the 2004 Monterrey Summit had not been
planned as part of the summit sequence, some governments in the re-
gion sought to expedite a meeting after the time and place for the
officially numbered "fourth" summit had already been announced for
2005 in Brazil. 93 The government of Brazil reportedly did not wish to
advance the date of its summit, or to relinquish the privilege of hold-
ing the next official summit, so a compromise was reached: Mexico
89. Records relating to the Port of Spain Summit can be found at http://www.summit-ameri
cas.org (last visited July 30, 2009).
90. The summit web site maintained by the OAS provides a summary and history of each
summit, including the "special" summits. See http://www.summit-americas.org/previoussum
mits.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2009).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. The United States, for example, was a chief proponent for holding an earlier meeting.
Many observers speculated that the White House was seeking an opportunity for then-President
George W. Bush to join his Latin American counterparts on an international stage early in a
campaign year and to show some initiative in the region while he remained in office, rather than
potentially ceding the process to a successor. The author was one of several moderators for civil
society preparatory meetings hosted by the Organization of American States and the Govern-
ment of Mexico as part of the Monterrey Summit preparatory process. These meetings included
the Regional Forum entitled Civil Society in the Processes of Hemispheric Integration, in the
Context of the Special Summit of the Americas held in Monterrey, Mexico, in November 2003,
and the Dialogue Between Plenipotentiaries and Civil Society Representatives, held in Monterrey
on January 11, 2004, the day before the opening of the Summit. See Civil Society in the
Processes of Hemispheric Integration, in the Context of the Special Summit of the Americas,
Mexico City, Mex., Nov. 24-25, 2008, http://www.summit-americas.org/Quebec-CivilSociety/
RegionalForum/bulletin-eng.pdf; Summit of the Americas Information Network, http://www.
summit-americas.org/SpecialSummit/CivilSociety/Mainpage-eng.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
The information provided in this note was gathered during these meetings and during many
informal discussions among the author and the participants in the Monterrey Summit and in
other aspects of the preparatory process.
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would host a non-numbered Special Summit, or Cumbre Ex-
traordinaria, in Monterrey in January of 1994.94
The summits are institutionally tied to the OAS, and this connection
has become stronger over time. The OAS serves as the summit secre-
tariat and has seen its own agenda increasingly shaped by summit
commitments. Yet summit agenda setting and implementation are
still technically independent of the OAS. The process of negotiating
and shaping summit agendas is managed by the Summit Implementa-
tion and Review Group (SIRG), which is chaired by the upcoming
summit's designated host country and steered by past summit host
countries. 95 An institutional tripartite committee, which includes the
OAS, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the UN Ec-
onomic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
helps to oversee summit implementation. 96
The inter-American summits have typically featured one to three
days of presidential plenary sessions and side meetings among heads
of state and their delegations. Official documents have traditionally
been signed by participating heads of state.97 These include "declara-
tions," which are essentially a broad statement of principles, and
"plans of action," which are more detailed lists of commitments that
state leaders will pursue in order to advance the principles on which
they have agreed.98 The action plans are often general and vague, but
94. This information is based on conversations by the author with participants in summit plan-
ning, although it does not appear that the reasons for this arrangement have been acknowledged
in print.
95. For those interested in more background on inter-American summits generally, the OAS
maintains a web site at http://www.summit-americas.org. See also ADVANCING THE MIAMI PRO-
CESS: CIVIL SoCIETY AND THE SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS (Robin Rosenberg & Steve Stein eds.,
1995) (highlighting the goals and outcomes of the early summit process and reprinting many of
the original preparatory documents).
96. See, e.g., Second Summit of the Americas, Santiago de Chile, Chile, Apr. 18-19, 1998,
Santiago Declaration and Plan of Action [hereinafter Santiago Plan of Action], reprinted at 37
I.L.M. 947, 958 (1998).
97. The 2009 Port of Spain Summit marked an exception to this tradition. See infra note 131
and accompanying text.
98. These two documents were issued for the summits in Miami, Santa Cruz, Santiago, Que-
bec City, and Mar del Plata. See discussion infra notes 136-169, 177-181 and accompanying text
(detailing outcomes from each of these summits). At the 2004 Special Summit (Cumbre Ex-
traordinaria) in Monterrey, no plan of action was issued; instead, heads of state signed the Decla-
ration of Nuevo Le6n, which was largely a statement of principles but which included some
concrete commitments such as those typically found in a plan of action. See Special Summit of
the Americas, Monterrey, Nuevo Le6n, Mexico, Jan. 13, 2004, Declaration of Nuevo Le6n, avail-
able at http://www.summit-americas.org/sp-summit/sp-summit-dec-en.pdf (last visited July 30,
2009). At the most recent summit in Port of Spain, heads of state signed no final document.
Instead, Trinidad's Prime Minister, as summit host, signed a declaration of commitment on be-
half of the heads of state. See Declaration of Commitment of Port of Spain, OEA/Ser.E, CA-V/
DEC.1/09 (April 19, 2009), available at CA-V/DEC.1/09 (last visited Nov. 6, 2009) [hereinafter
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in some cases they include more concrete commitments to work to-
ward social goals.99 The declarations and action plans are negotiated
through the SIRG in a relatively transparent process that offers both
formal and informal opportunities for non-state actors to offer advice,
including advice about specific language, and to comment on elements
of the documents. Non-state actors also work informally with the tri-
partite committee institutions, especially the technical units of the
OAS, to conduct research and develop reports and recommendations
that inform the preparation of summit documents. 100
The subject matter of inter-American summits has varied widely to
cover a range of security, economic, and social interests in the region.
A commitment to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) emerged at the First Summit in Miami,1°1 and greater eco-
nomic integration remained a subject of many subsequent summit
commitments until an impasse over the creation of a new regional free
trade zone emerged in Quebec, which has hardened in subsequent
summits.10 2 In addition to serving as a platform for the discussion of
Port of Spain Declaration]. See infra notes 182-202 and accompanying text (discussing the con-
text and outcomes of the Port of Spain summit).
99. These goals have included promoting universal primary education, establishing coopera-
tive networks or institutions, and pursuing binding legal instruments. Frequently, plans of action
also include instructions to regional institutions, often the OAS or one of its organs, directing
them to pursue a project, prepare a report on an issue of concern, or both.
100. SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS PROCESS (2004),
copy on file with author; see also ORG. OF AM. STATES, INTER-AM. COUNCIL FOR INTEGRAL
DEV., INTER-AMERICAN STRATEGY FOR THE PROMOTION OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DECI-
SION MAKING FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2001) [hereinafter ISP FINAL REPORT], availa-
ble at http://www.oas.org/dsd/PDF files/ispenglish.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2009) (official report
of the formulation of the OAS participation strategy, which includes accounts of public meetings
and joint research that informed the strategy) .
101. See ORG. OF AM. STATES, 1 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE SUMMIT PROCESS FROM
MIAMI TO SANTIAGO 213-40 (1998); SUMMIT REPORT 2001-2003: ADVANCING IN THE AMERI-
CAS, PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES SUMMITS OF THE
AMERICA SECRETARIAT 62 (2004), available at http://www.summit-americas.org/pubs/sum-
mit-reportII-en.pdf (copy on file with author); First Summit of the Americas, Miami, Fl., Dec.
11, 1994, First Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, reprinted in
34 I.L.M. 808 (1995). The Miami Declaration and Plan of Action are available at http://www.
summit-americas.org/miamidec.htm and http://www.summit-americas.org/miamiplan.htm,
respectively.
102. Venezuela noted reservations regarding the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) in the final Declaration of the Quebec Summit in 2001. See Third Summit of the Amer-
icas, Quebec City, Can., Apr. 20-22, 2001, Declaration of Quebec City, at 6, available at http://
www.oas.org/dil/Declaration-ofQuebecCity.pdf [hereinafter Quebec Declaration]. Vene-
zuela's opposition to the FTAA at the Monterrey Summit in 2004, along with objections by
Brazil, scuttled hopes for a commitment to complete the trade accord on a specific timetable.
See Robert Collier, Modest Gains for Bush at Summit of Americas; Sweeping Promises, Sharp
Divisions As 34-Nation Meeting Ends, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 14, 2004, at Al. At the Fourth
Summit in Mar del Plata in 2005, the language in the Declaration regarding the proposed FFAA
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competing trade agendas, summits have addressed concerns over edu-
cation, labor rights, gender discrimination, human rights, the environ-
ment, democracy, transparency, health, and urban development,
among others.
IV. NON-STATE ACCESS TO INTER-AMERICAN SUMMITS
To understand how non-state actors have engaged in and influenced
summit planning and outcomes, it is useful to begin with an analysis of
the summit process itself because it offers a view of how rhetoric
about participation accompanied a normative shift toward a more
open and participatory process. The precedent was set when the prep-
arations for the Miami Summit-including the preparation of back-
ground papers and the negotiation of documents to be signed by
heads of state, integrated NGOs, academics, and other interested non-
state actors-exposed OAS member states and the OAS itself to a
was equivocal, noting that "some member states" remain optimistic about the FTAA and that
these states instruct their trade officials through the Declaration to resume negotiations in 2006.
See Fourth Summit of the Americas, Mar Del Plata, Arg., Nov. 5, 2005, Declaration of Mar del
Plata, I 19A [hereinafter Mar Del Plata Declaration], available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/
56901.htm (last visited July 28, 2009). The Mar Del Plata Declaration also states that
other member states maintain that the necessary conditions are not yet in place for
achieving a balanced and equitable free trade agreement with effective access to mar-
kets free from subsidies and trade-distorting practices, and that takes into account the
needs and sensitivities of all partners, as well as the differences in the levels of develop-
ment and size of the economies.
Id. I 19B. While the Declaration does not identify the dissenting states, press accounts reported
that Venezuela, which continued to object to the FTAA as a neo-imperial project, was joined by
states of the Mercado Comin del Sur (MERCOSUR), which consists of Argentina, Brazil, Para-
guay, and Uruguay as full members, and Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru as associ-
ate members. See American Society of International Law, Reports on International
Organizations, http://www.asil.org/rio/mercosur_sum09.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). These
states objected to a trade agreement unless it addressed U.S. agricultural subsidies. See Patrick
J. McDonnell & Edwin Chen, Bush Exits Summit As Trade Talks End in Disagreement, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005, at Al; Julie Mason & John Otis, Summit of the Americas; Clash ofIdeology
in Street, at Forum, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 5, 2005, at Al. The unusual bifurcated text
offered some measure of compromise that would allow trade ministers to return to the negotiat-
ing table. During the Hong Kong WTO meeting in December 2005, an agreement was finally
reached on agricultural subsidies, calling for their elimination by 2013. See World Trade Organi-
zation, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC (Dec. 22, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.wto.org/english/theVVTO-e/minist-e/min05_e/finaltexte.pdf (last visited Aug.
2, 2009). While this might have offered an opportunity for the MERCOSUR countries to join
continued FTAA negotiations, trade discussions have instead proceeded on a bilateral and sub-
regional basis. See J.F. HORNBECK, A FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS: MAJOR POLICY
ISSUES AND STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2008), available
at http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RS20864 (last visited Sept. 14, 2009). The idea of the FTAA
was not even mentioned in the final document to emerge from the Port of Spain summit. See
Port of Spain Declaration, supra note 98; see also infra notes 182-202 and accompanying text
(discussing the context and outcomes of the Port of Spain summit).
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level of participation that had not been seen in prior regional policy
making processes. 10 3 In the time leading up to the Miami Summit, the
U.S. administration had made a decision to involve non-state actors in
the summit process, and as the "host government," it sponsored a se-
ries of roundtables and workshops among NGOs from throughout the
region to discuss the summit agenda.'0 4 These workshops were at-
tended by OAS officials and summit negotiators from a number of
OAS member states, mostly foreign ministry representatives, but in
some cases representatives from ministries with responsibilities for the
subject areas of the summit, such as education, environment, and
health. The United States also tapped a congressionally funded think
tank at the University of Miami, the North-South Center, to serve as
an unofficial non-governmental host of the summit. The North-South
Center held a number of meetings on summit issues that were at-
tended by government delegates and non-state actors both prior to
and during the summit.10 5
This participatory approach continued over the next two years in
the process leading up to the Santa Cruz Summit. The Bolivian Gov-
ernment welcomed the participation of non-state actors in the formu-
lation of the Santa Cruz Summit agenda;106 for example, as host of the
upcoming summit, it participated in a regional dialogue hosted by the
Government of Uruguay on "enabling responsible participation,"
"strengthening representative organizations," and "expanding ave-
nues for participation" (collectively the Montevideo Dialogue) the
outcomes of which were offered to Bolivia and other OAS members
states as input for the Santa Cruz summit agenda. 10 7 This dialogue
103. For a description of the level of participation, including copies of a number of NGO
submissions and the results of NGO consultations, see generally ADVANCING THE MIAMI PRO-
CESS, supra note 95.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. At the time, the government of Bolivia was experimenting with democratic reform at a
national level, having just passed a new national law on democratic participation-the Ley de
Participaci6n Popular (Popular Participation Law). See Ley No. 1551, 20 Apr. 1994 (Bol.), avail-
able at http://www2.ids.ac.uk/logolink/resources/downloads/regionalreports/RegionalReport
LatinAmericaAnnex%20final%20.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). It was essentially a decentrali-
zation law, recognizing hundreds of new municipalities and local and indigenous communities as
Organizaciones Territoriales de Base (Base Territorial Organizations), and giving them some in-
put on national budget expenditures at a local level. For a description of how the Popular Partic-
ipation Law operated, see MERILEE S. GRINDLE, AUDACIOUS REFORMS: INSTITUTIONAL
INVENTION AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 94-96 (2000).
107. See INTER-AMERICAN SEMINAR ON PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOP-
MENT: REPORT ON PROCEEDINGS (1996) [hereinafter MONTEVIDEO REPORT] (on file with au-
thor). Uruguay was at the time serving as the "responsible government" for follow-up on
summit agenda items relating to democracy and participation, and the seminar was co-sponsored
by the OAS and USAID, among others. Id. at I; see also ADVANCING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOP-
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attracted over 150 participants including government representatives
from twenty-three of the thirty-four OAS member states, along with
non-state actors from throughout the region, 08 and it produced a rec-
ommendation to pursue a regional strategy for participation in devel-
opment decision making that was adopted as part of the Santa Cruz
Summit Plan of Action. 10 9
The Bolivian Government contracted with the World Resources In-
stitute (WRI), a U.S.-based NGO, to provide advice on creating a
plan of action for sustainable development, 110 and the U.S. Govern-
ment again financed a series of NGO consultations leading up to the
Santa Cruz Summit, including the Montevideo Dialogue.111 The Dec-
laration and Plan of Action adopted in Santa Cruz incorporated the
principal recommendation from the Montevideo Dialogue: to formu-
MENT IN THE AMERICAS: U.S. CIVIL SOCIETY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 1996 SUMMIT CON-
FERENCE ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SANTA CRUZ, BOLIVIA 3, available at www.brazilink.
org/tiki-download-file.php?fileld=7 (last visited Nov. 6, 2009) (discussing the Bolivian govern-
ment's "full support and participation" in the Montevideo conference); Eric Dannenmaier, De-
mocracy in Development: Toward a Legal Framework for the Americas, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1,
11-14 (1997) (describing the Montevideo meeting in detail); CORPORACION PARTICIPA, CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION IN THE SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS: NINE YEARS OF EXPERIENCE OF THE NET-
WORK OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAS, available at http://www.civil-soci-
ety.oas.org/Publicaci6n%20Cumbre%209%20afios%20ing.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2009)
(describing the decision to adopt Montevideo recommendations regarding the formulation of a
regional strategy for public participation).
108. MONTEVIDEO REPORT, supra note 107, at 1.
109. The Montevideo meeting recommendation was reflected in the final Plan of Action from
Santa Cruz, which called for the design of an "inter-American strategy for public participation in
sustainable development decision-making" (ISP). See Summit of the Americas on Sustainable
Development, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bol., Dec. 7-8, 1996, Plan of Action for the Sustainable
Development of the Americas, at 14-15 [hereinafter Santa Cruz Plan of Action], available at
http://www.summit-americas.org/boliviaplan.htm; see also infra notes 209-226 (describing the de-
velopment of the ISP).
110. See Aaron Zazueta, Draft Plan of Action for Santa Cruz Summit (1995) (on file with
author). While Zazueta's role as an outside NGO advisor to the Bolivian government was not
well publicized at the time, it is documented in contemporaneous intergovernmental communi-
cations and in his professional biography. As of September 2009, Zazueta serves with the Moni-
toring and Evaluation Office of the Global Environment Facility (GEF). His biography sheet
published by GEF includes the following entry:
[Zazueta] was appointed by Vice President Al Gore on to a Special Commission to
assist the Bolivian President to incorporate sustainable development into the policies
and programs carried out during his administration. He co-chaired the technical com-
mission that drafted the Hemispheric Agenda for Sustainable Development, ultimately
adopted by thirty two heads of state of the Americas in December 1996.
GEF, Evaluation Office Staff Directory, http://www.gefweb.org/gefevaluation.aspx?id=23144
(last visited Sept. 14, 2009). The "Hemispheric Agenda" referred to in Zazueta's GEF biogra-
phy is the 1996 Santa Cruz Summit Plan of Action. Id.
111. See MONTEVIDEO REPORT, supra note 107, at 1.
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late an "inter-American strategy for the promotion of public partici-
pation in sustainable development decision-making. ' 112
The practice of public consultation continued with the Santiago
Summit in 1998 as the Government of Chile, with financial support
from Canada and the United States, contracted a Santiago-based
NGO, Corporaci6n Participa, to host a series of NGO consultations
for input into the Santiago Declaration and Plan of Action. 113
Corporaci6n Participa facilitated civil society consultations on three of
the four principal topics of the summit-education, democratic gov-
ernance, and poverty, but not hemispheric trade-with government
officials who were negotiating the text sitting alongside civil society
participants on panels and roundtables. 114 As with Santa Cruz, there
is evidence that some of the NGO priorities were reflected in the final
Santiago Summit Declaration and Plan of Action.1 15
NGO participation continued in the subsequent summits in Quebec
City, Canada (2001), Monterrey, Mexico (2004), Mar del Plata, Ar-
gentina (2005), and Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago (2009),116 and
112. Santa Cruz Plan of Action, supra note 109, at 14. The actions taken following the Santa
Cruz Summit to implement this part of the Plan of Action are more fully described infra Part VI.
A.
113. See PROJECT RESULTS: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SUMMIT OF THE
AMERICAS (1999), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf-docs/PDABR033.pdf (last visited Nov. 2,
2009); see also Yasmine Shamsi, MUTUAL MISGIVINGS: CIVIL SOCIETY INCLUSION IN THE AMERI-
CAS 26-31 (2003), available at http://www.un-ngls.org/orf/cso/mutual-misgivings.pdf (last visited
Nov. 2, 2009); Ambassador Ellen Bogle of Jamaica, Statement to Workshop on the Role of
Public Participation in Santiago, Chile (Nov. 5-7, 1997) (on file with author). After describing
consultations with civil society throughout the region during the three years following the Miami
Summit and highlighting the role of civil society organizations in preparations for the Santiago
Summit, the Ambassador concluded, "Indeed, it may well be that, following this meeting, Ja-
maica and Uruguay [coordinators for civil society in the summit process] can present to the
Coordinator of the Santiago Summit, Chile's Ambassador Juan Martabit, a new and more mean-
ingful text which will reflect the efforts of the stakeholders." Bogle, supra, at 2.
114. Agenda of Workshop on the Role of Public Participation, Santiago, Chile (Nov. 5-7,
1997) (copy on file with author).
115. The Santiago Plan of Action stated that "governments will [piromote, with the participa-
tion of civil society, the development of principles and recommendations for institutional
frameworks to stimulate the formation of responsible and transparent, non-profit and other civil
society organizations .... " Santiago Plan of Action, supra note 96, III.A.I. The Santiago
Plan of Action then refers to the Inter-American Strategy for the Promotion of Public Participa-
tion in Sustainable Development Decision-Making (ISP)-which had been pursued by the OAS
with substantial civil society participation following the Santa Cruz Summit-and states, "[A]s
soon as possible, Governments will adopt work plans to implement legal and institutional
frameworks based on the principles and recommendations in their respective countries." Id.
This language was proposed by the OAS Unit for Sustainable Development and Environment
and the NGOs working with the Unit to develop the ISP. See infra notes 224-226 and accompa-
nying text.
116. A brief description of activities undertaken to engage civil society in connection with
each of the summits is provided at the Summits of the Americas web site maintained jointly with
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has been supported by an OAS Civil Society Office, established fol-
lowing the 1996 Santiago Summit.1 17 A coalition of NGOs, led by
Corporaci6n Participa from Chile, the Canadian Foundation for the
Americas (FOCAL), and the U.S.-based Partners of the Americas
and the Inter-American Democracy Network (IADN), has worked
with the OAS Civil Society Office and summit host governments to
facilitate workshops, seminars, and other forms of outreach as a
means of incorporating input from non-state actors into the summit
process.' 18 Funding from the U.S. government has continued-al-
though it was reduced and refocused under the Bush administra-
tion' 19-principally through the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID). Funding from the Canadian Government
has also continued, principally through Canada-based FOCAL and
Chile-based Corporaci6n Participa.120
Non-state participation has thus become de rigueur, even routine, in
inter-American summitry. Governments have largely welcomed an
increasing dialogue with non-state actors both in formal and informal
settings. For their part, non-state actors have embraced the process
even where they do not embrace the motivations or goals of the state
leaders who gather for the summits, and this counter-current is toler-
ated-sometimes even sponsored by-governments against which it
runs. For example, in addition to funding dialogue with civil society
the OAS at http://www.summit-americas.org/cs.html#Hemisphere (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
This site offers hyperlinks to official web pages maintained by host countries for each of the
summits. In each case the country web site offers a summary of civil society activities sponsored
or hosted by governments in connection with the summit.
117. This office was created as part of a broader institutional reform aimed at engaging non-
state actors more fully in the work of the OAS. See infra Part VI.D (describing efforts to create
NGO accreditation rules for the OAS). Following its creation, the office was moved into the
OAS Department of International Affairs. See http://www.civil-society.oas.org/ (last visited Nov.
7. 2009) (as of the time this Article went to press this web site serves as the principal formal
point of entry for non-state actors to the OAS).
118. See, e.g., the discussion of summits and civil society input into the summit process on the
websites of Corporaci6n Participa, www.participa.cl (last visited July 28, 2009); Canadian Foun-
dation for the Americas, www.focal.ca (last visited July 28, 2009); Partners of the Americas,
www.partners.net (last visited July 28, 2009); Interamerican Democracy Network, http://www.
redinter.org (last visited July 28, 2009); Civil Society Participation in OAS Activities, ewww.
civil-society.oas.org (last visited July 28, 2009); Summits of the Americas, www.summit-americas.
org (last visited July 28, 2009),
119. When George W. Bush took office in January 2001, his administration shifted emphasis
from participatory democracy and the integration of NGOs into the summit process to the pro-
motion of electoral democracy and an effort to ensure the continued exclusion of non-democra-
cies-notably Cuba-from the summit process and inter-American institutions generally. See
infra note 250 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. regional priorities and policy toward Cuba
in the context of developing the Inter-American Democratic Charter).
120. This information is based on interviews with staff of the Canadian Foundation for the
Americas (FOCAL) and Corporaci6n Participa. Notes on file with author.
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organizations about the formulation of the summit agenda at Quebec
in 2001, the Canadian government also funded a parallel event, the
self-titled People's Summit, which was largely a protest meeting held
outside the security zone of the official summit.121
At Mar del Plata in 2005, a parallel protest event at a soccer sta-
dium featured President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, who left the offi-
cial proceedings to deliver an anti-trade, anti-neoliberal, anti-U.S. rant
that lasted more than two hours before an estimated crowd of
20,000.122 While Chavez has become notorious for his unorthodox
and contrarion approach to diplomacy, 23 the willingness of host gov-
ernment Argentina to permit such a public forum is noteworthy. In
addition, one should not discount the importance of giving voice to a
message of protest in the company of a large, seemingly receptive,
audience 124 in close proximity to a head of state meeting devoted to
pursuing some of the very goals which were the subject of protest.
Professor Richard Feinberg has criticized the Mar del Plata summit as
a "shambles" in part because of "a duplicitous host government [and]
an out-of-control Hugo Chivez."'1 25 Feinberg's credentials and expe-
rience in Western Hemisphere affairs give his insights regarding Mar
del Plata special weight, 26 yet his critique speaks more to substantive
challenges of inter-American relations than to any procedural debility
of summits as a public forum. The counterproductive use of a public
121. The website for the People's Summit in Quebec (a similar event had taken place in Santi-
ago) describes its purpose as creating "a space and an opportunity for progressive civil society
from north and south, to come together as equals. During the Summit we will debate, define
new strategies for the Americas and create new alliances. The Summit will be another crucial
step in the process of developing Alternatives." Quebec City-Protest the Summit of the Amer-
icas, http://www.web.net/comfront/quebec.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
122. Larry Rohter & Elisabeth Bumiller, Protesters Riot As Bush Attends 34-Nation Talks,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2005, at 1; Colin McMahon Protesters Scorn Bush at Summit, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Nov. 5, 2005, at 1.
123. See, e.g., Warren Hoge, Venezuelan's Diatribe Seen As Fatal to U.N. Council Bid, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2006, at A6 (recounting Chavez's statement during a speech to the U.N. General
Assembly in September 2006 that "he could still smell the telltale scent of sulfur on the General
Assembly rostrum where Mr. Bush had spoken the day before").
124. One opinion writer described television coverage of "applauding" crowds attending the
Chavez speech. John Hughes, Chavez's Socialism Won't Help Latin America; Free Trade Will,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 9, 2005, at 9.
125. Richard Feinberg, Making the Fifth Summit the Finest So Far. FOCAL Poir, July-Au-
gust 2008, at 1, available at http://www.focal.calpublications/focalpoint/fpO808/?article=article2&
lang=e (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
126. In addition to broad practical and academic experience in inter-American relations, Pro-
fessor Feinberg was Senior Director of the National Security Council's Office of Inter-American
Affairs under President Clinton, and in that post served as a principal architect of the 1994
Miami summit. His biography and CV are reproduced at the University of California San Diego
School of International Relations and International Studies web site, available at http://irps.
ucsd.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/richard-feinberg.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
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forum by a self-styled populist like Chavez (who would find a plat-
form in any event) does not discount the need for, or importance of,
public non-state forums held in connection with the summit. Chavez
may have stolen headlines-a feat of which he has proven capable
even in the more traditional diplomatic cloisters of the United Nations
in New York 127-but engaging the public more quietly in debating
summit priorities and outcomes through public forums that were insti-
tutionalized through the summit process deprived Chavez of any claim
to monopoly on public discourse. Put another way, Chavez cannot
maintain that he is the only regional leader speaking to the people
about their interests in regional political and institutional priorities.
By the time the 2009 Port of Spain Summit convened, inter-Ameri-
can politics had shifted in ways that would create even greater chal-
lenges to substantive outcomes for a common regional agenda. Voters
in Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Nicaragua elected populist leaders
with socialist leanings 128-which was anathema to some of the core
regional integration goals that had defined the summit agenda since
Miamil 9-and Chavez was thus joined at Port of Spain by heads of
state who could match his substantive concerns if not his rhetoric.
While Chavez had been reduced to noting exceptions to earlier sum-
mit agreements1 30 these new ideological partners added enough
weight to undermine support for outcomes which depend upon con-
sensus. A single state dissent in a summit of thirty-four states will
produce exceptions, but not necessarily scuttle a consensus document.
But five dissenting states can change the dynamics of consensus.
127. See supra note 123 (describing Chavez's 2006 U.N. performance).
128. Evo Morales became President of Bolivia in January 2006, Manuel Zelaya took office as
President of Honduras in January 2006, and Rafael Correa became President of Ecuador in
January 2007, and Daniel Ortega returned to the presidency of Nicaragua in January 2007, hav-
ing previously served in that office from 1985 to 1990. Each has joined an economic alliance
with Venezuela called the "Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our Americas," which pro-
motes an agenda that Venezuela's President Chavez has branded as "21st Century Socialism."
Tyler Bridges, Tough Times for Leftist Leaders; Six Aligned Latin American Countries Find Pop-
ulism Is Slowing, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Florida) July 5, 2009, at 13A.
129. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
130. The 2001 Quebec Declaration includes a reservation that states in part, "The Venezuelan
delegation wishes to reserve its position on paragraphs 1 [which relates to strengthening repre-
sentative democracy] and 6 [which instructs foreign ministers to prepare an Inter-American
Democratic Charter], because, according to our government, democracy should be understood
in its broadest sense and not only in its representative quality." Quebec Declaration, supra note
102. at 6. The Quebec Declaration also includes a reservation by Venezuela regarding the pro-
posed FTAA. The 2005 Mar del Plata Declaration includes a reservation by Venezuela to a
paragraph under the "Strengthening Democratic Governance" heading that states, "We are con-
vinced that representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace, and
development of the region." Mar del Plata Declaration, supra note 102, 58,
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The Port of Spain summit thus produced a Declaration signed by
the chair rather than participating heads of state,131 and the substance
of the Declaration's text relating to democracy appears to reflect the
parties' lack of substantive agreement on what exactly is meant by
democracy. 132 But non-state actors remained a part of the Port of
Spain summit, both in the preparatory meetings where the summit
agenda was debated and at the summit itself.133 Non-state partici-
pants were afforded an opportunity to engage diplomats formally and
informally in shaping a regional agenda even if the agenda had be-
come captive to new regional politics. 134 Whether these new politics
represent an anomaly or a trend that will overshadow the broader co-
operative agenda of the summit process is uncertain. But even a rising
disagreement about the nature of democracy at Port of Spain did not
lead states to retreat from the tradition of non-state access that has
become part of the summit process.
V. COMMITMENTS TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Democratic governance and public participation have been consis-
tent inter-American summit themes, and the rising dispute over how
best to address these themes at a regional level 135 only serves to high-
131. At the conclusion of the Trinidad Summit, a dispute over some final aspects of the agree-
ment and the continuing exclusion of Cuba from the inter-American political process led Vene-
zuelan President Hugo Chavez, Bolivian President Evo Morales, Honduran President Jose
Manuel Zelaya, and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega to withhold their signatures. See Shal-
iza Hassanali, Morales to Colleagues: Don't Sign Declaration, TRIN. & TOBAGO GUARDIAN, Apr.
18, 2009, available at http://guardian.co.ttnewslgeneral/2009/04/19/morales-colleagues-don-t-
sign-declaration; Americas Rivals See Signs of Hope, BBC NEWS, Apr. 19 2009, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8007305.stm; Tamara Pearson, Venezuela and ALBA Pro-
mote "New Climate" in Summit of the Americas, TRIN. & TOBA o NEWS.cOM, Apr. 21, 2009,
available at http://www.trinidadandtobagonews.com/5summit/210409.html (last visited Sept. 5,
2009). The Trinidad summit chair, Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Patrick Manning, signed
a statement indicating that the parties had agreed that he "would sign the declaration as having
been adopted by all Heads of State and Government attending the Summit." Fifth Summit of
the Americas, Apr. 17-19, 2009, Port of Spain, Trin. & Tobago, Statement by the Chairman of the
Fifth Summit of the Americas, the Honourable Patrick Manning, Prime Minister of the Republic
of Trinidad and Tobago, at 4, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.E CA-V/DP-1/09 (Apr. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.summit-americas.org/V-Summit/statement-chair en.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
132. See infra notes 188-200 and accompanying text.
133. The summit web site maintained by the OAS includes a compilation of documents
describing consultations with various non-state actors, including indigenous peoples, youth,
academia, labor, and private sector representatives. See http://www.summit-americas.org/
GA09_CD/psa en.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). Dialogue between ministers of foreign af-
fairs and non-state actors was also held. Id.
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 128-132 and accompanying text (describing the emergence of Vene-
zuela's objection to summit language regarding democracy in the context of the 2001 Quebec
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light their importance as summit objectives. The following outlines
commitments made to advance both electoral and participatory demo-
cratic models in summits held to date.
A. Miami (1994)
The Miami Declaration affirmed that "[d]emocracy is based, among
other fundamentals, on free and transparent elections and includes
the right of all citizens to participate in government." 136 The Declara-
tion called for making "democratic institutions more transparent and
accountable," and it expressed an interest in ensuring "public engage-
ment and commitment."' 37 The Miami Plan of Action asserted that
"[t]he strengthening, effective exercise and consolidation of democ-
racy constitute the central political priority of the Americas,"' 138 and it
called on the OAS "to promote and consolidate representative de-
mocracy. ' 139 Governments committed to "give expeditious considera-
tion to ratifying the Cartagena de Indias,140 Washington, 141 and
Managua 142 Protocols to the OAS Charter," each of which added
commitments to representative democracy to the OAS Charter.143
The Miami Plan of Action also called for regional institutional reform,
including strengthening the ability of a technical office of the OAS,
the Unit for Promotion of Democracy, so that it could provide assis-
tance to "interested state[s]" in legislative and judicial processes and
the administration of justice.144
The Miami Plan of Action also highlighted the importance of public
participation, including civil society's access to information and the
decision-making process. The plan states that "a vigorous democracy
requires broad participation in public issues. Such activities should be
carried out with complete transparency and accountability, and to this
summit, and increasing support for that objection among more recently elected leaders in the
region).
136. Miami Declaration, supra note 101, at 810.
137. Id. at 810, 813.
138. Miami Plan of Action, supra note 101, at 815.
139. Id.
140. Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States, Dec. 5,
1985, 25 I.L.M. 527, 527-530 (1986) [hereinafter Protocol of Cartagena de Indias].
141. Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States, Dec.
14, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 981, 1005 (1994) [hereinafter Protocol of Washington].
142. Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States, June
10, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 981, 1009-10 (1994).
143. The Protocol of Washington amended Article 33 of the OAS Charter to affirm that "[t]he
Member States agree that ... the full participation of their peoples in decisions relating to their
own development are .. .basic objectives of integral development." Protocol of Washington,
supra note 141, at 1007.
144. Miami Plan of Action, supra note 101, at 815.
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end a proper legal and regulatory framework should be established to
include the possibility of obtaining technical and financial support, in-
cluding from private sources. '145 This language points, albeit ob-
liquely, to the need to develop frameworks for the operation and
financing of NGOs, which was a relatively new phenomenon in the
Americas in the early 1990s. The Plan of Action also calls for in-
creased access to information as a means to combat official corrup-
tion, which was a perennial inter-American summit theme. Heads of
state pledged to "[e]nsure proper oversight of government functions
by strengthening internal mechanisms, including investigative and en-
forcement capacity with respect to acts of corruption, and facilitating
public access to information necessary for meaningful outside
review. '146
In a later part of the Miami Plan of Action dealing with environ-
mental issues and sustainable development, heads of state again ex-
pressed support for participatory models. They pledged to "[s]upport
democratic governmental mechanisms to engage public participation,
particularly including members of indigenous communities and other
affected groups, in the development of policy involving conservation
and sustainable use of natural environments. 1 147
B. Santa Cruz (1996)
Held two years after the Miami Summit, the Santa Cruz Summit on
Sustainable Development echoed the themes of democratic govern-
ance and public participation. The Santa Cruz Declaration pledges
that states "will support and encourage, as a basic requisite for sus-
tainable development, broad participation by civil society in the deci-
sion-making process, including policies and programs and their design,
implementation, and evaluation. To this end, we will promote the en-
hancement of institutional mechanisms for public participation."'' 48
The Santa Cruz Declaration and Plan of Action called for public par-
ticipation in a range of development areas, from watershed manage-
ment to the use of forests and the conservation of biological
diversity.149 The Plan of Action also called for the OAS to "assign[ ]
priority to the formulation of an inter-American strategy for the pro-
145. Id. at 817.
146. Id. at 818.
147. Id. at 833. The Plan of Action notes, however, that "[t]he forms of this participation
should be defined by each individual country." Id.
148. Summit of the Americas on Sustainable Development, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bol., Dec.
7-8, 1996, Declaration of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 8, available at http://www.summit-americas.
org/boliviadec.htm.
149. See Santa Cruz Plan of Action, supra note 109, at 5, 7, 8-10.
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motion of public participation in decision-making for sustainable
development."1 5 0
C. Santiago (1998)
In 1998, at the inter-American summit in Santiago, Chile, heads of
state again highlighted the importance of participatory democracy,
both in principle and through commitments to institutional reform.
The Santiago Declaration states that
the strength and meaning of representative democracy lie in the ac-
tive participation of individuals at all levels of civic life. The demo-
cratic culture must encompass our entire population. We will
strengthen education for democracy and promote the necessary ac-
tions for government institutions to become more participatory
structures. We undertake to strengthen the capabilities of regional
and local governments, when appropriate, and to foster more active
participation in civil society. 15a
Heads of state also pledged that "[t]he FTAA negotiating process will
be transparent," and they "encourage[d] all segments of civil society
to participate in and contribute to the process in a constructive man-
ner, through our respective mechanisms of dialogue and consultation
and by presenting their views through the mechanism created in the
FTAA negotiating process. 1 52
The Santiago Plan of Action included a pledge by states to "inten-
sify our efforts to promote democratic reforms at the regional and
local level." 153 The OAS had been working to develop the Inter-
American Strategy for the Promotion of Public Participation in Sus-
tainable Development Decision-Making (ISP) since the Santa Cruz
Summit two years earlier,154 and the Santiago Plan of Action reads
like an endorsement of the ISP's terms of reference. Heads of state
agreed to
[p]romote, with the participation of civil society, the development of
principles and recommendations for institutional frameworks to
stimulate the formation of responsible and transparent, non-profit
and other civil society organizations, including, where appropriate,
programs for volunteers, and encourage, in accordance with na-
tional priorities, public sector-civil society dialogue and partnerships
in the areas that are considered pertinent in this Plan of Action. In
150. Id. at 14-15.
151. Second Summit of the Americas, Santiago de Chile, Apr. 18-19, 1998, Declaration of
Santiago, available at http://www.summit-americas.org/chiledec.htm.
152. Id. at 3.
153. Santiago Plan of Action, supra note 96, at 8.
154. See infra Part VI.A.
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this context the Organization of American States (OAS) may serve
as a forum for the exchange of experiences and information. 155
The Santiago Plan of Action goes on to state that the process of
strengthening participatory mechanisms should "draw upon existing
initiatives that promote increased participation of civil society in pub-
lic issues, such as... the Inter-American Strategy for Public Participa-
tion, among others. 1 56 The Plan of Action also pledges that, "[a]s
soon as possible, Governments will adopt work plans to implement
legal and institutional frameworks based on the principles and recom-
mendations in their respective countries. '157
D. Quebec City (2001)
In 2001, the Quebec City Summit Declaration acknowledged "the
contributions of civil society"'158 to the summit process and "affirm[ed]
that openness and transparency are vital to building public awareness
and legitimacy. '159 The Quebec Plan of Action noted that "good gov-
ernance requires ... transparent and accountable government institu-
tions at all levels," as well as "public participation.' ' 160 Heads of state
agreed to
[w]ork jointly to facilitate cooperation among national institutions
with the responsibility to guarantee the protection, promotion and
respect of human rights, and access to and freedom of information,
with the aim of developing best practices to improve the administra-
tion of information held by governments on individuals and facili-
tating citizen access to that information. 161
The Plan of Action also committed to "[c]reate and implement pro-
grams with the technical and financial support, where appropriate, of
multilateral organizations and [multilateral development banks], to fa-
cilitate public participation and transparency ... in decision-making
processes. '"162 The Quebec Plan of Action also noted that "men and
women have the right to participate, with equality and equity, in the
155. Santiago Plan of Action, supra note 96, at 7-8.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 12.
158. Quebec Declaration, supra note 102, at 6.
159. Id. at 2.
160. Quebec Plan of Action, supra note 34, at 1.
161. Id. at 2. This provision is aimed at ensuring greater transparency and information access
rather than direct participation in decision-making processes. But information access is central
to effective participation, and it is recognized, along with access to justice, as a critical compo-
nent of public participation frameworks. See United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, Rio de Janeiro, Bra., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and De-
velopment, Principle 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev.1 (1992).
162. Quebec Plan of Action, supra note 34, at 2.
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decision-making processes affecting their lives and well-being," 163 and
heads of state pledged to "[p]romote participation of all minority
groups in forging a stronger civil society. '164
Additionally, the Plan of Action addressed participation at a local
level, pledging to "[p]romote mechanisms to facilitate citizen partici-
pation in politics, especially in local or municipal government." 165 It
also addressed regional institutions, agreeing, for example, to
"[e]nsure the transparency of the negotiating process, including
through publication of the preliminary draft FTAA Agreement in the
four official languages as soon as possible and the dissemination of
additional information on the progress of negotiations."' 166 The Que-
bec Plan of Action called for greater openness of the FTAA process.
Specifically, states agreed to
[floster through their respective national dialogue mechanisms and
through appropriate FTAA mechanisms, a process of increasing and
sustained communication with civil society to ensure that it has a
clear perception of the development of the FTAA negotiating pro-
cess [and] invite civil society to continue to contribute to the FTAA
process.167
While this language hints at the marketing of the FTAA,168 it suggests
a degree of transparency and openness to public dialogue about the
content of the proposed Agreement.
Finally, and significantly, the Quebec Declaration took note of
"threats to democracy," an indirect reference to the then-evolving
constitutional challenges in Peru, 169 and called for the preparation of
an Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC). Although more con-
crete commitments are usually reserved for action plans, the Quebec
Declaration, in language that is unusually specific and action-oriented,
reads:
163. Id. at 13.
164. Id. at 14.
165. Id. at 3.
166. Id. at 14.
167. Id. at 14.
168. By stressing the need to "ensure that" civil society has a "clear perception of the devel-
opment of the FTAA negotiating process," the text appears aimed at promotion rather than
engagement. While this brings a degree of transparency to the process, the transparency is tied
to a description of the venture rather than the right to influence the venture. A promise to
"ensure that" civil society has an "opportunity to influence" or an "opportunity for input into"
FTAA negotiations would advance participation interests far more directly. That said, trans-
parency is an aid to informed input and thus advances the goal of participation even if it does not
seem to make that goal a priority.
169. Quebec Declaration, supra note 102, at 2. See infra notes 243-252 and accompanying
text (describing the political situation in Peru preceding the Quebec summit).
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Threats to democracy today take many forms. To enhance our abil-
ity to respond to these threats, we instruct our Foreign Ministers to
prepare, in the framework of the next General Assembly of the
OAS, an Inter-American Democratic Charter to reinforce OAS in-
struments for the active defense of representative democracy. 170
E. Monterrey (2004)
At Monterrey, Mexico, heads of state did not produce a Plan of
Action, but only a statement of principles entitled the Declaration of
Nuevo Le6n. 171 One of the summit's three central themes was demo-
cratic governance, and a number of provisions in the Declaration sup-
ported participatory processes. The Declaration of Nuevo Le6n calls
for the "full application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter,
which constitutes an element of regional identity, and, projected inter-
nationally, is a hemispheric contribution to the community of na-
tions. ' '172  Heads of state also pledged to "foster a culture of
democracy and development based on pluralism and the acceptance
of social and cultural diversity. ' 173 In addition, the Declaration of
Nuevo Le6n committed to increased transparency in international or-
ganizations, 174 and heads of state undertook to "institutionalize meet-
ings with civil society and with the academic and private sectors. ' 175
The Declaration also asserted that
[a]ccess to information held by the State, subject to constitutional
and legal norms, including those on privacy and confidentiality, is an
indispensable condition for citizen participation and promotes effec-
tive respect for human rights. We are committed to providing the
legal and regulatory framework and the structures and conditions
required to guarantee the right of access to information to our
citizens.176
170. Quebec Declaration, supra note 102, at 2. An exception to this provision was noted by
Venezuela, the first such exception ever noted to an inter-American summit declaration or plan
of action. Id. at 4 n.1.
171. Special Summit of the Americas, Monterrey, Nuevo Le6n, Mex., Jan. 13, 2004, Declara-
tion of Nuevo Le6n, available at http://www.summit-americas.org/SpecialSummit/Declarations/
Declaration %20of%20Nuevo%2OLeon%20-%20final.pdf.
172. Id. at 9. The Inter-American Democratic Charter was negotiated following the Quebec
Summit and was signed in Lima, Peru on September 11, 2001. John W. Graham, A Magna Carta
for the Americas, The Inter-American Democractic Charter: Genesis, Challenges and Canadian
Connections, FOCAL Policy Paper (Sep. 2002) at 4-5 available at http://www.focal.ca/pdf/
iadscharter.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). See also Strengthening the Democratic Commitment,
OAS informal briefing paper for General Assembly (2001), available at http://www.oas.org/char
ter/docs/why-charter.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 10.
175. Id. at 11.
176. Id.
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F Mar del Plata (2005)
The Declaration from the most recent inter-American summit, held
in Mar del Plata, Argentina, claims that heads of state "are convinced
that representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the
stability, peace, and development of the region. ' 17 7 It also acknowl-
edges that "[i]ncreased participation by citizens, communities, and
civil society will contribute to ensuring that the benefits of democracy
are shared by society as a whole."'1 78 The Declaration goes further to
link democratic governance to a range of benefits, including economic
prosperity, "decent jobs and good employment," and the security of
the state. 179 The Mar del Plata Plan of Action offers only limited new
initiatives for democratic governance, instead calling for greater com-
mitment to regional security, increased effort to combat corruption,
and development of a regional extradition network, ironically all
under the general heading of "Strengthening Democratic Govern-
ance."18s0 The Plan of Action instructs the OAS Summit Implementa-
tion Review Group (SIRG) to continue to "coordinate the
participation of civil society" in summit planning and implementa-
tion.181
G. Port of Spain
The 2009 summit in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago occurred
against the backdrop of a global economic downturn that had a severe
impact on the Americas. 182 The summit also followed the ascendance
of new left-leaning presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Nic-
aragua.1 83 These new heads of state joined Venezuela's President
Hugo Chavez in rejecting some of the fundamental ideas that had
driven regional political relations and the summit agenda since Miami
in 1994.184 Port of Spain also marked the first inter-American summit
177. Declaration of Mar de Plata, supra note 102, 58. Venezuela noted a reservation to this
provision.
178. Id. $ 62.
179. Id. 1$ 64, 67, 72.
180. Id. [ 57-76.
181. Id. 1 74.
182. See Eduardo Fermlndez-Arias & Peter J. Montiel, Crisis Response in Latin America: Is
the "Rainy Day" at Hand? 5-11 (Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper No. 686,
June 2009), available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docum=2024179 (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009) (describing the impact of the 2008 global economic crisis in Latin
America).
183. See supra note 128 (discussing the election of new leaders in each country).
184. Presidents Morales, Correa, Zelaya, and Ortega have each embraced socialist rhetoric
and policy objectives. Id. At the summits preceding Port of Spain, Chavez insisted on excep-
tions to the consensus documents reflecting his distrust of a trade-driven (what he terms a neo-
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of the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama, but much of
the early preparatory work had been done under the guidance of po-
litical appointees of his predecessor, George W. Bush. While this con-
text may have had a profound impact on summit negotiations and
outcomes, analyzing this impact is beyond the scope of this Article.
What can be reported that is relevant to this Article is that summit
commitments to fundamental democratic concerns of electoral pro-
cess and public participation-commitments to expand participatory
rights at a regional and domestic level, including calls for the ISP185
and the IADC186-stalled in Port of Spain.187
A "Declaration of Commitment" signed "on behalf of heads of
state and government" by summit host, Trinidad and Tobago Prime
Minister Patrick Manning. 188 The Port of Spain Declaration included
a section on "Strengthening Democratic Governance, ' 89 which ad-
dresses poverty,190 decentralization,' 91 corruption, 92 access to govern-
ment budgets, 93 human rights,194 social inclusion, 195 "all forms of
discrimination,"196 indigenous rights, 97 the protection of children, 198
and the role of the OAS in promoting peace' 99-ostensibly as these
concerns relate to strengthening democracy. These are important so-
cial concerns that should not be discounted, but they notably do not
address core issues of electoral or participatory democracy at the do-
mestic or regional level.
liberal) agenda. See supra note 102 (discussing Venezuela's reservations to the summit agree-
ment in Quebec regarding the proposed FFAA); supra note 122 and accompanying text
(describing Chavez's speech at the Mar de Plata summit denouncing a "neo liberal" regional
trade agenda). As the agenda for Port of Spain was negotiated, Chavez was no longer the lone
voice in this regard.
185. See infra notes 214 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 251-252 and accompanying text.
187. Statement by the Chairman of the Fifth Summit of the Americas, the Honourable Patrick
Manning, Prime Minister of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, OEA/Ser.E, CA-V/DP-1/09
(Apr. 19, 2009), available at, http://www.summit-americas.orglVSummit/statement-chair-en.pdf
(last visited Nov. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Port of Spain Chairman's Statement].
188. Port of Spain Declaration, supra note 98.
189. Id. 11 78-88.
190. Id. 1 78.
191. Id. 91 79.
192. Id. 91 80.
193. Id. 91 81.
194. Id. IT 82-83.
195. Id. 84.
196. Id. 91 85.
197. Id. 1 86.
198. Id. 91 87.
199. Id. 91 88.
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It is difficult to say whether the abandonment of these core issues at
Port of Spain reflects a new regional emphasis or simply a passing
artifact of regional political interests or tensions.200 But participatory
democracy issues are not dead to inter-American summits. Although
Port of Spain did not produce new initiatives specifically dealing with
these issues, broader commitments made under the heading of "dem-
ocratic governance"-especially language concerning corruption and
access to information concerning government finances 201-respond to
core democratic concerns, and commitments to access mechanisms
made at prior summits continued to be pursued in the broader re-
gional institutional context.20 2
VI. COMMITMENTS TO DEMOCRACY: FOUR CASE STUDIES
The preceding Part catalogues the extent to which inter-American
summits have embraced the rhetoric of democracy, including ideas of
participatory democracy and governance through open, transparent,
and inclusive processes. Yet much of the language is merely preca-
tory, expressing statements of principle or wishes and desires that do
not call for specific action. A cynical view would hold that summit
declarations and plans of action are not even aspirational: they are
just smokescreens for inaction. Political leaders, from this perspec-
tive, are simply making statements that allow them to claim some
moral high ground, even as they ignore deeper challenges and avoid
taking the difficult policy steps that might advance the causes that
they purport to champion.
To be sure, summit documents include a good deal of language
about promoting democracy that is beyond the capacity or will of sig-
natories to act. Yet the summit commitments also call for the devel-
opment of specific programs and institutional responses that can begin
to support the higher democratic ideals of summit rhetoric. The call
for an Inter-American Democratic Charter in Quebec City, which
would have binding elements, 20 3 was quite concrete, as was the agree-
200. This neglect of earlier summit priorities is difficult to explain in terms of the public sum-
mit record. Venezuela had pushed for some integration of participatory democracy principles
into the IADC, see supra note 130, and while the distinct diplomatic goals of individual states
engaged in the summit process cannot be definitively discerned, it is possible that disagreement
over how to frame direct democracy (participatory and electoral) concerns in the context of the
Port of Spain Summit could not be overcome in framing a final text, even where the text was
only framed as a Chair's statement.
201. See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
202. See infra Part VI (discussing commitments to regional democratic mechanisms made at
prior summits and ongoing efforts to implement these commitments).
203. See infra notes 251-252 and accompanying text.
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ment reached in Santa Cruz to create a program to design the ISP.204
Statements in Miami, Santa Cruz, and Santiago summit agreements
about the importance of civil society and the role of the OAS as a
public forum served as tangible reference points for a later OAS Gen-
eral Assembly resolution that advanced a program of NGO accredita-
tion in the OAS.205 Even the call in Miami for securing participatory
rights through "proper legal and regulatory framework[s], ' ' 20 6 while
more rhetorical than programmatic, may have significance beyond its
symbolic value. Even rhetoric, when stated publicly and plainly, has
an enduring value with the potential to transform attitudes and alter
institutional behavior, at least in a context where interested parties
can refer to and build upon that rhetoric in pursuit of more concrete
programs. As James Madison once noted about the Bill of Rights,
which he privately claimed did not need to be set forth affirma-
tively,20 7 "political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by
degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free Government,
and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment,
counteract the impulses of interest and passion. '20
What, then, has been the utility of the inter-American summit
claims and commitments about democratic governance and public
participation? By placing the language in context, an answer begins to
emerge. In a number of cases, summit commitments have grown out
of regional or domestic initiatives that were championed by specific
governments or by non-state actors working with governments, and
the summit has helped to advance those initiatives through official ac-
knowledgement and institutional action. The following four cases are
illustrative.
A. Inter-American Strategy for the Promotion of Public
Participation in Sustainable Development Decision-Making (ISP)
In the months prior to the 1996 Santa Cruz Summit in Bolivia, an
informal working group of governmental officials and non-state actors
met to discuss how public participation issues should be addressed in
204. See infra notes 214-217 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 285-289 and accompanying text.
206. Miami Plan of Action, supra note 101, at 5.
207. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 298-99 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977). Madison confided to Jefferson, "I
have never thought the omission [of a Bill of Rights] a material defect." Id. at 297. Among
other reasons for this position, Madison explained, "I have not viewed it in an important light ...
because I conceive that in a certain degree ... the rights in question are reserved by the manner
in which the federal powers are granted." Id.
208. Id. at 298-99.
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the context of the upcoming summit. Participants included represent-
atives of the government of Uruguay,20 9 the OAS, and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as a repre-
sentative of World Resources Institute (WRI) who had been tapped
by the Bolivian government to offer advice on the formulation of a
summit agenda. 210 This informal working group facilitated the design
of a regional consultation held in Montevideo, Uruguay and co-hosted
by the governments of Bolivia and Uruguay in August 1996. The con-
sultation resulted in a series of recommendations for consideration in
planning the 1996 Santa Cruz Summit.211
The Montevideo meeting convened over 150 participants, including
representatives of more than twenty governments from the region and
a range of NGOs and academics. 212 Participants used an informal
workshop approach to develop recommendations for the heads of
state who would meet in Santa Cruz later in the year. The principal
recommendation was that heads of state should commit to the formu-
lation of an inter-American strategy for public participation.213 This
recommendation was adopted verbatim at the subsequent summit,
and the outcomes of the Montevideo meeting were cited in the Santa
Cruz Plan of Action as a point of guidance in the development of the
strategy. In a section entitled "Public Participation," the Santa Cruz
Plan of Action stated,
15. In order to support the specific initiatives on public participa-
tion contained in the Plan of Action, entrust the OAS with assigning
priority to the formulation of an inter-American strategy for the
promotion of public participation in decision-making for sustainable
209. Uruguay had been designated as the "responsible coordinator" for follow-up on summit
commitments regarding democratic governance. The system of "responsible coordinators" was
developed following the 1992 Miami Summit as a means of identifying "countries or interna-
tional organizations [to] volunteer to coordinate implementation of individual action items, tak-
ing the lead in developing an implementation strategy, convening meetings, and communicating
relevant information about the implementation process." Summit Implementation: An Evolving
Process (unpublished paper presented to the IV SIRG by the United States), http://www.
summit-americas.org/SIRG/1995/IV/Summit-paper-USA-IVSIRG.htm (last visited Sept. 27,
2006).
210. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. The author served as part of this informal
working group in his capacity as an advisor to U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and participated in much of the subsequent planning and development of the ISP.
Information regarding participation in the meetings is based on the author's recollection and on
documents-including agendas, correspondence, and working papers-that are on file with the
author. The work of the informal group, like the later work of the ISP, was always meant to be
open and transparent, and not classified or privileged in any way.
211. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text. For a more complete description of the
Montevideo meeting, see Dannenmaier, Democracy in Development, supra note 107, at 12-13.
212. See MONTEVIDEo REPORT, supra note 107, at 1.
213. Id. at 1-2, 5-7.
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development, taking into account the recommendations of the In-
ter-American Seminar on Public Participation held in Montevideo
in 1996.
16. The strategy should promote the exchange of experiences and
information among government representatives and civil society
groups with regard to the formulation, implementation, and im-
provement of sustainable development policies and programs, legal
and institutional mechanisms, including access to and flow of infor-
mation among the relevant actors, training programs, and consulta-
tion processes used at the national level to ensure civil society
involvement. Establish consultation processes at the regional level,
such as regular fora for government-civil society dialogue at rele-
vant high-level meetings convened by the OAS, and when necessary
support the integration and strengthening of national sustainable
development councils, drawing on the experience of Central
America and other existing councils in the Hemisphere. 214
Because the OAS had been involved in the formulation of this pro-
posal from the beginning through an arm of its Permanent Secretariat,
the Unit for Sustainable Development and Environment (UDSE), 215
it was positioned to respond to this summit commitment quickly.
Within a year of the Santa Cruz Summit, the USDE had formed a
technical advisory group to begin developing a regional participation
strategy.216 With the support of the ISP Technical Advisory Group,
the OAS USDE also formed a separate Project Advisory Committee
that included seven representatives from OAS member states-two
each from North, South, and Central America, and one from the Car-
ibbean-and seven non-governmental representatives who were nom-
inated and selected by NGOs of the region from seven areas of
work.217
During 1997 and 1998, the Technical Advisory Group, with gui-
dance from the Public Advisory Committee, hosted a series of public
workshops, funded pilot studies, and sponsored research regarding
frameworks and mechanisms, including legal and regulatory
frameworks, in order to help frame the ISP and promote public partic-
ipation in the region more generally.218 More than $1 million in fund-
214. Santa Cruz Plan of Action, supra note 109, at 14-15.
215. The OAS Unit for Sustainable Development and Environment (USDE) is now known as
the OAS Department of Sustainable Development. See http://www.oas.org/dsd/ (last visited
Sept. 12, 2009).
216. The author was a member of the ISP Technical Advisory Group and participated in its
deliberations throughout the time that the OAS worked to develop the ISP.
217. The seven NGO areas of work were Business, Trade, and Economic Growth; Environ-
mentally Sustainable Development; Socially Sustainable Development; Women's Issues; Minor-
ity or Marginalized Peoples (non-Indigenous); Indigenous Peoples; and Labor Interests. A
contact list for the OAS/ISP is maintained on file with the author.
218. Workshop agendas, participant lists, and reports of outcome are on file with the author.
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ing support was provided collectively by USAID, the Global
Environment Facility (GEF), and the United Nations Economic and
Social Council (UNESCO).2 19 The work resulted in a fifty-one page
strategy document that was given the same name as the project: the
Inter-American Strategy for the Promotion of Public Participation in
Decision-Making for Sustainable Development.220 This strategy docu-
ment was adopted by the OAS Inter-American Council on Integral
Development (CIDI) on April 20, 2000.221 While the document does
not purport to bind OAS member states to specific actions, it does
include a series of recommendations for implementation by member
states at a national level. In a section entitled "Legal Frameworks,"
the ISP recommends that OAS member states "[c]reate, expand, and
implement legal and regulatory frameworks that ensure the participa-
tion of civil society in sustainable development decisions. ' 222 It also
includes a section entitled "Institutional Procedures and Structures,"
recommending that OAS member states "[d]evelop and support insti-
tutional structures, policies, and procedures that promote and facili-
tate, within all levels of government and civil society, interaction in
sustainable development decisions, and encourage change within ex-
isting institutions to pursue a basis for long-term direct dialogue and
innovative solutions. '223
These recommendations were developed over a two-year period
through a process that included the participation of government offi-
cials-usually a combination of foreign ministry officials and those
from technical ministries, such as ministries of the environment, at
whom the recommendations were aimed-alongside NGO partici-
pants, scholars, and OAS staff.224 They were adopted in draft form at
219. Copies of the ISP budget and grant instruments, along with reports by OAS USDE per-
sonnel on funding sources and budgeting, are on file with the author.
220. See Org. of Am. States, Inter-American Strategy for the Promotion of Public Participation
in Decision-Making for Sustainable Development, OEA/Ser.D/XXIII.1 (2001) [hereinafter ISP
Strategy Document], available at http://www.oas.org/dsd/PDF-files/ispenglish.pdf (last visited
Aug. 1, 2009).
221. CIDI Res. 98 (V/O/00), 5th Reg. Meeting, OEA/Ser.W/II.5. CIDI/Doc. 25/00 (Apr. 20,
2000).
222. ISP Strategy Document, supra note 220, at 7 (Policy Recommendation No. 2).
223. Id. at 9 (Policy Recommendation No. 3).
224. Non-state actor input was facilitated by the Technical Advisory Group, which oversaw
the two-year process and helped draft much of the final language of the ISP, as well as the
Project Advisory Committee, which participated in public meetings and periodically met to ad-
vise the OAS USDE on project design. The author served as a member of this group. Notes
from the Technical Advisory Group and the Project Advisory Committee meetings are on file
with the author. See also ISP Strategy Document, supra note 220, at 13-15 (describing the pro-
cess through which the ISP was developed and emphasizing the role of public consultations and
advisors drawn from civil society).
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a regional meeting that included representatives from most OAS
member states, and they were vetted at a national level by technical
ministries following the regional meeting and prior to CIDI approval
of the ISP.225 Thus, the recommendations were vetted at a national
level by relevant officials through a process that offered ample oppor-
tunity for non-state actors to influence the thinking of these officials
and give shape to the final ISP. Moreover, throughout the process,
draft language of the ISP was presented at public meetings and the
details were discussed and debated among participants from civil soci-
ety and government agencies. The suggestions of participants in these
meetings, both state officials and non-state actors, regularly found
their way into the ISP draft.2 2
6
B. Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC)
Although the twentieth century history of Latin America and the
Caribbean has been characterized by authoritarian regimes and vio-
lent transfers of power, the region saw a pronounced shift toward
electoral democracy in the 1980s, and this move became consolidated,
or at least stable, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 227 Despite a
number of "irregular disruptions"228 and moves by some leaders to
225. As a member of the Technical Advisory Group, the author made a presentation on the
process of regional consultations to an inter-governmental meeting on the ISP held in Mexico
City in September 1999. This presentation described outreach efforts undertaken by the Techni-
cal Advisory Group, including a mailing of hundreds of surveys regarding the proposed ISP to
NGOs identified by Project Advisory Committee members and other OAS contacts, thirteen
national consultations hosted in and by OAS member states, and a two-week virtual discussion
hosted over the internet by the OAS, among other efforts. A copy of this presentation is on file
with the author. See also Richard A. Meganck, Head, OAS USDE, Speech at Mexico City
Meeting, 1-2 (Sept. 8, 1999) (copy on file with author) (describing the importance of input from
civil society actors in formulating the ISP).
226. Agendas, participant lists, and reports of outcome from these meetings, along with per-
sonal notes about the process, including Technical Advisory Group and Project Advisory Com-
mittee meetings, are on file with the author. The ISP Strategy Document also describes this
iterative and open process. See ISP Strategy Document, supra note 220, at iii (foreward by
Richard A. Meganck); id. at 13-14 (describing the "unique advisory structure [which] ensured
that the ISP itself was open to continual input and that it supported the ongoing work of the
regular OAS staff, consultants, and dedicated volunteers").
227. See Scott Mainwaring, The Surprising Resilience of Elected Governments, 10 J. DEMOC-
RACY 101-114, 101 (1999) (despite shortcomings, "[b]y 1990, virtually every government in the
region was either democratic or semidemocratic"); Larry Diamond, Is the Third Wave Over?, 7 J.
DEMOCRACY 20-37, 29-30 (1996) (describes the "growing gap between electoral and liberal de-
mocracy" in the region, but notes that the "persistence of constitutional procedures gives
grounds for hope about the future of democracy in Latin America");
228. The term "irregular disruptions" was used by Arturo Valenzuela, who is now a professor
of government at Georgetown University, but who was formerly Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent and Senior Director for Inter-American Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council from
1999 to 2000. In a recent article, Valenzuela reports that "[f]rom 1930 until 1980, 40 percent of
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amend constitutional term limits in order to extend their opportunities
for re-election,2 29 all but one state in the region is now a nominal de-
mocracy. 230 While the recent history of electoral democracy in the
region is difficult to describe as stable, a tradition of political change
by military coup has largely given way to change through the electoral
process. Honduran President Ernesto Zelaya was ousted by elements
of the Honduran army in late June 2009,231 ending almost two decades
of respite since the last successful military coup in the region, which
occurred in Haiti in 1991.232 But the Honduran coup had the explicit
support of the country's Supreme Court and legislature, 233 and oc-
curred after the President had taken what many in the country
claimed were extra-constitutional steps when no constitutional process
for impeachment existed.234 Despite universal regional condemnation
of Mr. Zelaya's ouster,235 the move by his country's military was itself
alleged, perhaps ironically, to have been taken in defense of Hondu-
ras's constitutional order.236 During the eighteen years between the
1991 coup in Haiti and the 2009 coup in Honduras, and perhaps even
despite recent events in Honduras, it can be argued that civilian-led
constitutional systems have taken root in most countries despite in-
stances of unrest.237
all governmental changes in Latin America were by military coups," and that this "number
dropped by half in the 1980s." Arturo Valenzuela, Putting Latin America Back on the Map, 42
FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2005, at 16, 16 (2005).
229. In 1995, President Carlos Menem of Argentina succeeded in an effort to change the
constitution so that he could run for a second consecutive term. However, in 1999 he failed to
gather sufficient support to reinterpret the constitution so that he could serve a third term. Pro-
file: Carlos Menem, BBC NEWS, Apr. 28, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/
202482.stm (last visited Sept. 25, 2009). In 2009, Hugo Chavez succeeded in having constitu-
tional term limits lifted so that he could run for an additional term. See Tyler Bridges, Term
Limit Win for Chavez, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 16, 2009, at 10. Bolivia's Evo Morales and Ecuador's
Rafael Correa have won similar challenges to constitutional term limits. Id.
230. Cuba is the lone exception, although some have questioned the democratic quality of
several other governments in the region. See generally Mainwaring, supra note 227 (discussing
the shortcomings of Latin American democracies).
231. See Elisabeth Malkin, Honduran Army Ousts President Allied to Chavez, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 2009, at Al.
232. See Haitian Army Seizes Power in Bloody Coup, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 1991, at 3C.
233. See Malkin, supra note 231.
234. See Ghost of Coups Past, CAN. GLOBE & MAIL, June 30, 2009, at A16.
235. See Mary Beth Sheridan, U.S. Condemns Honduran Coup, WASH. POST, June 30, 2009, at
AS; Press Release, Org. of Am. States, OAS Permanent Council Condemns Coup D'etat in
Honduras, Calls Meeting of Ministers and Entrusts Secretary General with Carrying Out Con-
sultations, June 28, 2009, available at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press-releases/pressrelease.
asp?sCodigo=E-214/09 (last visited July 10, 2009).
236. See Ramon Antonio Vargas, Local Hondurans Back Zelaya's Ouster; But Don't Call It a
Coup, They Say, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 30, 2009, at 8.
237. For a discussion of the relative stability in the years preceding the Honduras coup, see
Valenzuela, supra note 228, at 16. See also Mainwaring and Diamond, supra note 227. The term
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In an effort to secure democratic practices and electoral transitions
in the region, the OAS General Assembly approved the Santiago
Commitment to Democracy and the Strengthening of the Inter-Amer-
ican System at its 1991 meeting in Santiago, Chile, and it embraced
the idea of collective response to any illegal or sudden interruption of
democratic rule. 238 The Santiago Commitment was supplemented at
the same General Assembly by a Resolution on Representative De-
mocracy, known as Resolution 1080, the purpose of which was to
"promote and consolidate representative democracy" in the region by
creating a response mechanism "in the event of any occurrences giv-
ing rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic polit-
ical institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the
"relative" stability is used because constitutional challenges did occur between 1991 and 2009.
These include Alberto Fujimori's "auto-golpe," or "self-coup," in Peru in 1992, which saw an
elected president suspend the constitution, dissolve congress, and retain plenary power until
November 2000; in Venezuela in 2002, when opposition parties supported by the military tempo-
rarily ousted an elected president, Hugo Chavez, for roughly two weeks in May; and in Haiti in
February 2004, when elected president Jean Bertrand Aristide left the country in the face of
mounting opposition-beginning with his contested 2001 election and escalating to a full-scale
national rebellion-but was replaced by his constitutional successor, Boniface Alexandre, the
President of the Haitian Supreme Court. In addition, democratically elected presidents were
forced to resign early in the face of popular pressure in Ecuador (Abdallah Bucaram in February
1997, followed by Jamil Mahuad in January 2001), Argentina (Fernando de la Rua in December
2001, followed by four others within a matter of weeks, with Nestor Kirchner later elected in
May 2003), and Bolivia (Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada in October 2003, followed by his vice presi-
dent, Carlos Mesa, who resigned in June 2005 and was succeeded by the President of the Boliv-
ian Supreme Court until elections were held in December 2005). An April 2005 article about the
resignation of Ecuador's president after a "constitutional coup" provides a further "brief cata-
logue of irregular changes of government" in the region that includes the examples above as well
as the 1999 presidential resignation in Paraguay and the 2001-2002 presidential successions
brought on by economic woes in Argentina. See "Constitutional Coup" by Congress Ousts Gu-
tierrez on Wave of Popular Protests, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Apr. 26, 2005, at 1-3. In each of
these cases, succession occurred under established constitutional procedures, and the military
was a minor player or notably absent, usually remaining quartered while civilian authorities
worked through succession procedures and later held elections. Some have argued that even the
recent Honduras coup is hard to categorize as an overthrow of civilian power, despite its obvious
constitutional challenge, because the military acted after key national civilian institutions, the
country's supreme court and congress, raised serious concerns about a third branch's extra-con-
stitutional behavior. See Vargas, supra note 236; see also infra note 315 (discussing more recent
developments in Honduras).
238. See Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American Sys-
tem, Santiago, Chile, OAS GA, 3d plenary sess., June 4, 1991, OEA/Ser.P/XXI.O.2 (Aug. 20,
1991), at 1-3, available at http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/agres/ag03805EO1.pdf (last visited Nov. 6,
2009); see also Stephen J. Schnably, The Santiago Commitment as a Call to Democracy in the
United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV 393, 399 (1994) (arguing that the Santiago Commitment moved Latin American nations
"closer to a more activist position posture toward military coups").
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democratically elected government in any OAS Member State. ' 239 A
year later, a special session of the OAS General Assembly approved
an amendment to the OAS Charter, known as the Washington Proto-
col, which calls for the suspension of any OAS member state whose
government is overthrown by force. 240
While these instruments supported the ideal of elected government,
they failed to provide a concrete mechanism that responded to inter-
nal assaults on elected governments. The Santiago Commitment of-
fers only precatory language, and although Resolution 1080 provides a
basis for consultation, at least where a threat is external or clearly
extra-constitutional, it offers no real basis for response. Instead, it
merely calls for the "immediate convocation" of the OAS Permanent
Council to "examine the situation" and to convene foreign ministers
for further discussion. 24' While it provides for a meeting of the Gen-
eral Assembly to "look into the events collectively and adopt any de-
cisions deemed appropriate, in accordance with the OAS Charter and
international law,"' 242 there is no real guidance on what course of ac-
tion the General Assembly might appropriately take. Thus, Resolu-
tion 1080 allows for the kind of joint deliberation that would likely
occur in any event, but does not create a meaningful procedural re-
sponse. Even the Washington Protocol, which would punish a success-
ful coup with membership suspension, does little more than state the
obvious course of action because a suspension would likely be sought
even absent the Charter amendment, and it gives no hope of immedi-
ate relief to a legitimate government under pressure or to a state
whose government has stepped outside of constitutional bounds. Res-
olution 1080 only addresses external challenges to power, but it does
not deal with cases in which an elected government seeks to remain
beyond its constitutional tenure or in which an election is stolen.
These debilities became apparent during Peru's 2000 election cycle
when its President, Alberto Fujimori, decided to run for a constitu-
tionally questionable third term and then won in what was widely re-
239. OAS G.A. Res. 1080, 1, 5th Plen. Sess., OAS Doc. AG/RES.1080 (XXI-O/91) (June 5,
1991), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/agresl080.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2009)
[hereinafter Resolution 1080].
240. Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States, art. 1,
Dec. 14, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 981, 1005. The amendment was approved in 1992 and entered into force
in 1997. OAS Department of International Law Treaties and Agreements Database, available at
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties-A-56_Protocol-ofjWashington-sign.htm (last visited Nov. 6,
2009).
241. Resolution 1080, supra note 239, 1.
242. Id. %$ 2-3.
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garded as a corrupt electoral process.243 Although the country and
the region had tolerated Fujimori's 1992 "self-coup," in which he sus-
pended Peru's Constitution and dissolved the country's Congress and
the Supreme Court in order to give himself latitude to fight the Shin-
ing Path guerilla insurgency, local and international constituencies
loudly protested his 2000 election. In 2000, a series of scandals involv-
ing his intelligence chief, Vladimir Montesinos, eroded Fujimori's re-
maining support at home and abroad, and, in the face of unrelenting
pressure, Fujimori left office later in November of the same year.244
He fled Peru, sought asylum in Japan, and submitted his resignation.
The resignation was rejected by Peru's Congress, which instead ap-
proved a resolution finding Fujimori "permanently morally unfit" to
continue his term and appointed its speaker, Valentin Paniagua, as
interim President.245
Paniagua learned a great deal about the inter-American frame-
work's inability to protect democratic governments from this experi-
ence. The terms of Resolution 1080 had not fit the circumstances of
the stolen election in Peru, and the OAS had been unable to agree to
invoke the resolution during a meeting of the General Assembly in
June 2000 in Windsor, Canada. Instead, the OAS sent a high level
mission comprised of "the Chair of the General Assembly and the
Secretary General of the OAS" to Peru in order to explore "options"
to strengthen democracy and to make recommendations for demo-
cratic reform. 246 Some credit this high level mission with smoothing
the transition as Fujimori fled the country the following November. 247
243. See Peter Hakim, Follow Up After Peru's Election, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May
31, 2000, at 20. Hakim is the President of the Inter-American Dialogue; see also Andres Tapia,
En Elecciones Peruanas, MENSAJERO, Apr. 19, 2000, at 8 (describing election irregularities); A
Second Chance for Toledo, and Peru, ECONOMIST, Apr. 15, 2000, at 31-32 (describing the context
of the election).
244. See Rick Vecchio, Fujimori Renuncia, MENSAJERO, Nov. 22, 2000, at 1.
245. Id.; see also Clifford Krauss, Peru Congress Says Fujimori Is "Unfit" and Picks Successor,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000, at A12 (describing the steps taken by Peru's congress to transfer
power to Mr. Paniagua following Fujimori's resignation and departure from the country). The
appointment of Paniagua was an appropriate constitutional step because both of the country's
vice presidents had also resigned. See The Future Without Fujimori, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2000,
at 38-39. For additional background, see Samantha Newbold, The Fujishock: How and Why Did
It Occur? An Analysis of Alberto Fujimori's Policy Reversal of 1990, in ENTRECAMINOS 2003
(2003).
246. OAS G.A. Res. 1753, 1, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P AG/RES. 1753 (XXX-O/00) (June 5,
2000).
247. See MAXWELL A. CAMERON, LIu INST. FOR GLOBAL ISSUES, THE INTER-AMERICAN
DEMOCRATIC CHARTER: TOWARD A PLAN OF ACTION (2003), available at http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/
sites/liu/files/Publications/19May2004_lnteramericanCharter.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
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Informed by its experience, Paniagua's transitional government
called for the creation of an Inter-American Democratic Charter in
part to ensure that the Inter-American System would respond when a
democratic state is "perverted from within" and in part to strengthen
the mechanisms for response.248 For Paniagua and Peru, the timing of
the upcoming Quebec City Summit was auspicious. The agenda for
the April summit was taking shape as Paniagua took office in Novem-
ber 2000, and it was finalized during the early months of 2001. Peru
found support from its neighbors in South and Central America; from
Canada, which had been directly involved diplomatically in the crisis
engendered by Fujimori's election and the Montesinos scandal;249 and
from the incoming Bush administration, which may have seen a demo-
cratic charter as a means to further secure the lock-out of Cuba from
the inter-American system as a means of pressing for political change
in Cuba.250  There was something of a groundswell of support for
Peru's initiative, and the final Declaration from the 2001 Quebec
Summit agreement included a "democracy clause" that stated,
We acknowledge that the values and practices of democracy are
fundamental to the advancement of all our objectives. The mainte-
nance and strengthening of the rule of law and strict respect for the
democratic system are, at the same time, a goal and a shared com-
mitment and are an essential condition of our presence at this and
future Summits. Consequently, any unconstitutional alteration or
interruption of the democratic order in a state of the Hemisphere
248. Members of Organization of American States Sign Declaration Supporting Democracy,
NoTISuR-S. AM. POL. & ECON. Am'., Sept. 14, 2001 (quoting Peruvian Foreign Minister Diego
Garcia Sayan on the need for a democratic charter: "Although Peru is not the only example, it
most clearly demonstrates that democracies can be perverted from within"); see also Nfer Muoz,
Politics-Americas: OAS Applauds Peru's Smooth Elections, INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 4, 2001
(reporting on diplomatic discussions at the OAS General Assembly then taking place in San
Jose, Costa Rica regarding Peru's political transition and the proposed Inter-American Demo-
cratic Charter).
249. As host of the June 2000 OAS General Assembly, Canada was Chair of the General
Assembly and its representative joined the Secretary General in the mission to Peru called for in
the June 5, 2000 resolution. Stephanie Boyd, Canadians Lauded For Work on Peru, TORONTO
STAR, Oct. 28, 2000, at 1 (describing work by Canadian diplomats in convincing the OAS to send
a mission to Peru and in brokering an agreement with Fujimori to hold elections).
250. President George W. Bush took office in January 2001, two months before the Quebec
Summit, and his new administration's Western Hemisphere policy-led by Under Secretary of
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Robert Noriega-was characterized in part by a policy of
increasing the isolation of Cuba as a means to compel internal political change. See Michele
Zebich-Knos, US Policy Toward Cuba: Trends and Transformation During the George W. Bush
Administration, in MICHELE ZEBICH-KNOS & HEATHER NORA NICOL, FOREIGN POLICY To-
WARD CUBA: ISOLATION OR ENGAGEMENT?, at 31, 32-36 (discussing the Bush administration's
turn away from engagement and toward further isolation of Cuba). More recently there has
been a move led by Cuba's allies within the inter-American system to re-integrate Cuba into
regional political institutions. See discussion supra at note 86 (describing 2009 OAS vote to
readmit Cuba upon its meeting certain commitments).
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constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the participation of that
state's government in the Summit of the Americas process. Having
due regard for existing hemispheric, regional and sub-regional
mechanisms, we agree to conduct consultations in the event of a
disruption of the democratic system of a country that participates in
the Summit process. 25l
The Quebec Declaration went further, calling for the development of
a binding regional Inter-American Democratic Charter to restate re-
gional democratic values, to help OAS member states "respond to"
democratic challenges, and "to reinforce OAS instruments for the ac-
tive defense of representative democracy."2 52
The Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) was negotiated in
the months following the Quebec Summit, and a draft was presented
by Peru to the OAS General Assembly in June 2001, although a final
agreement could not be reached.2 53 Negotiations continued through
the summer of 2001, and a final text was accepted by all OAS member
states except Venezuela. 25 4 Venezuela ultimately reserved its objec-
tions, and the IADC was signed in Lima, Peru on September 11,
2001.255
While it cannot be claimed that the IADC owes its existence to the
summit process alone, the timing and the process of the Quebec Sum-
251. Quebec Declaration, supra note 102, at 1.
252. Id. at 1-2. Venezuela noted an exception to this language. Id. at 4.
253. See Jim Lobe, New Chief Takes Over at OAS-and Gives Mixed Signals, INTER-PRESS
SERVICE, May 26, 2005.
254. Venezuela's stated reasons for objecting were that the Charter should refer to "par-
ticipatory" rather than "representative" democracy and, echoing the Cold War socialist bloc
theme in the human rights field, that a charter on "social rights" should be made an integral part
of any effort to define regional political rights. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTER-
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, 237-38 (2d ed. 2000) (describing how the debate over
two sets of human rights-civil and political versus economic, social, and cultural-had become
a "casualty of the Cold War"). At a subsequent OAS General Assembly meeting in 2004 in
Quito, Ecuador, Venezuela's Foreign Minister Jesus Arnaldo Pdrez again pushed for the adop-
tion of an inter-American social charter. According to Radio Nacional de Venezuela, he
"stressed the need to give democracy a 'social content,' because the continent has had 'enough of
elitist democracies."' Venezuela: Highlights of Radio Nacional de Venezuela (BBC Monitoring
International Reports June 7, 2004) (Global News Wire June 8, 2004). Venezuela's persistence
paid off: the OAS called for the formulation of a social charter at its 2004 General Assembly.
See OAS G.A. Res. 2056, 4th Plen. Sess., OAS Doc. AG/RES. 2056 (XXXIV-O/04) (June 8,
2004). The new Secretary General of the OAS-Jose Miguel Insulza, a former Interior Minister
from Chile-took up the call for a social charter shortly after his election in May 2005. See
Lobe, supra note 253. The 2005 General Assembly renewed the call to draft a social charter. See
OAS G.A. Res. 2139, OAS Doc. AG/RES. 2139 (XXXV-G/05) (June 7, 2005). The OAS began
the process of developing the Inter-American Social Charter with a ministerial meeting in Ca-
racas in August 2005. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Calls for "Understanding" with USA (BBC
Monitoring International Reports, Aug. 29, 2005) (Global News Wire Aug. 31, 2005).
255. Inter-American Democratic Charter, OAS G.A. Res. 1, 28th Spec. Sees., OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.P, AG/RES. 1 (XXVIII-E/01) (Sept. 10, 2001).
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mit helped advance the agreement. The fact that earlier summits had
dealt with the theme of democracy and that a constituency of state
and non-state actors looked to the summit process to advance demo-
cratic themes cannot have hurt.
Some observers have made the connection more directly. A policy
brief written by the Liu Institute for Global Studies at the University
of British Columbia, an Institute headed by former Canadian Foreign
Minister Lloyd Axworthy, asserted that
[tihe idea of a Charter might have been ignored and forgotten had it
not been taken up by the organizers of the Summit of the Americas
in Quebec City, which instigated the negotiations leading to the
signing of the Charter in September 11, 2001. The negotiation pro-
cess that culminated in the Charter was led by a coalition of coun-
tries including Peru, Canada, Costa Rica, Argentina, and Mexico. 256
C. FTAA Negotiations
As international trade agreements have been constructed in recent
years, calls for greater transparency and public access to the trade pro-
cess have increased, including access to negotiations on the texts of
agreements and to dispute resolution processes. This has been exem-
plified at the global level by a growing discourse on NGO participa-
tion in the processes of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
growing claims for access. 257 These claims have, in some respects, be-
gun to yield results in opening the WTO to non-state actors, although
256. THE INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC CHARTER: TOWARD A PLAN OF ACTION, supra
note 247, at 4 (emphasis omitted).
257. See, e.g., Chi Carmody, Beyond the Proposals: Public Participation in International Eco-
nomic Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1321, 1338-41 (2000) (describing efforts by NGOs to gain
access to the WTO); Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the
World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331, 331, 357 (1996) (tracing efforts by
NGOs to gain access to the WTO and arguing for the creation of formal opportunities for partic-
ipation); Daniel C. Esty, Linkages and Governance: NGOs at the World Trade Organization, 19
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 709, 719 (1998) (arguing that an "expanded role for NGOs, particularly
environmental groups, in the workings of the international trading system, would not only ad-
dress public choice problems that might otherwise diminish the legitimacy of WTO decision-
making, but would offer the prospect of broader political support for trade and investment liber-
alization"); John H. Jackson, The Linkage Problem-Comments on Five Texts, 96 AM. J. INT'L L.
118, 120 (2002) (noting the apparent agreement among five scholars contributing to a sympo-
sium edition on the WTO "that the V/TO as an institution is seriously flawed, in some cases
because of important institutional defects such as lack of democratic input, transparency, public
participation, and relationship with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)."); Gabrielle
Marceau & Peter Pedersen, Is the WTO Open and Transparent? A Discussion of the Relationship
of the WTO with Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society's Claims for More Trans-
parency and Public Participation, 33 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 37 (1999) (discussing the "state of
affairs" of claims for greater access to WTO work and noting some limited opportunities for
access to trade dispute settlement processes); Eric Stein, International Integration and Democ-
racy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 489, 504-06 (2001) (discussing criticism of "the
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the results have been quite modest and generally limited to the right
to "attend" Ministerial Conferences, 258 to participate in certain tech-
nical or informational forums, and to submit amicus briefs to dispute
resolution panels.259 No real institutional effort has been made to
open the WTO negotiating process to actors, although some delega-
tions have occasionally posted negotiating positions or specific pro-
posals on their web sites.260 This measure of transparency at least
informs public positions and allows non-state actors to think strategi-
cally about where allies and obstacles may lie.
Similar claims for access greeted negotiations for the proposed Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Unlike the WTO, which has
grown as an autonomous economic integration body, the FIAA pro-
posal had its origins in the inter-American summit process, having
been conceived at the Miami Summit,261 and advanced and promoted
in subsequent summits. FTAA negotiations stalled following the
Eighth Annual Ministerial Conference in Miami in 2003, and for a
number of reasons, the FTAA proposal has not been revived.262
way the GATTIWTO had used its power and the democratic deficit and lack of transparency and
legitimacy").
258. Marceau & Pedersen, supra note 257, at 5, 12.
259. See James Cameron & Stephen Orava, WTO Opens Disputes to Private Voices, NAT'L
L.J., Dec. 7, 1998, at B5-B6; Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests,
24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 173, 183-197 (2000).
260. See Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy-and Back Again: The Fate of the Mul-
tilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 115 (2002). This reflects the general attitude that
access to the process of making trade policy should be at the national level. See General Counsel
Decisions, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations, 6,
WT/L/162 (July 23, 1996), available at http:lwww.wto.orglenglish/forums-e/ngo-e/guide-e.htm
(last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
261. See Miami Plan of Action, supra note 101, at 11.
262. Negotiations were suspended after the Miami Ministerial Meeting for a number of rea-
sons. A principal impasse involved agricultural subsidies, and negotiations were halted in part so
that this difficult issue could be worked out first in the WTO. The issue was addressed at the
2005 WTO meeting in Hong Kong, thus clearing an obstacle to continuing the FTAA discus-
sions. A second obstacle was the policy position taken by Venezuela. President Hugo Chavez
has stridently opposed the FTAA on more or less philosophical grounds as a neocolonial or
neoliberal project. Perla Noguera, Chavez, en vez del ALCA eI ALBA, Feb. 212003, available at
http:lecuador.indymedia.org/es/200310211772.shtml (last visited Nov. 8, 2009) (quoting Chavez
as saying "el camino del neoliberalismo no es el correcto, ese modelo neoliberal fracas6 porque
moralmente no tiene sustentaci6n y nuestra Constituci6n es antineoliberal," author's translation:
"The path of neoliberalism is not correct, this neoliberal model failed because, morally, it has no
substance and our Constitution is antineoliberal."); Perla Noguera, El ALCA es un mecanismo
para la desintegraci6n de nuestros pueblos, Nov. 26, 2003, available at http://www.nuestraamerica.
info/leer.hlvs/2634 (last visited Nov. 8, 2009) (quoting Chavez as stating: "el ALCA constituye un
mecanismo para la desintegraci6n de nuestros pueblos y Reptiblicas," author's translation: "The
FTAA constitutes a mechanism for the disintegration of our people and republics"). The Vene-
zuelan delegation was apparently isolated in this position at the Miami Ministerial Meeting, but
subsequent events demonstrate that some other Latin American leaders are rethinking the ad-
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While regional trade negotiations may or may not be revived, the de-
gree of transparency and public access to the negotiation process was
clearly on the rise prior to suspension. As described below, this access
was informed by summit commitments and efforts to implement those
commitments.
At the Santiago Summit in 1998, heads of state explicitly called for
greater transparency and participation in FTAA negotiations:
The FTAA negotiating process will be transparent ... in order to
create the opportunities for the full participation by all countries.
We encourage all segments of civil society to participate in and con-
tribute to the process in a constructive manner, through our respec-
tive mechanisms of dialogue and consultation and by presenting
their views through the mechanism created in the FTAA negotiat-
ing process. 263
While this commitment is aimed in part at the participation of smaller
states whose capacity to engage in complex and protracted trade ne-
gotiations is limited, it also contemplates a degree of openness to non-
state actors. The mechanism referred to is the Committee of Govern-
ment Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society (SOC),
which was created as part of a broader scheme to receive input from
civil society on a range of issues, and which convened for the first time
several months after the Santiago Summit.264
Heads of state renewed their commitment to a transparent process
at the Quebec Summit in 2001 by pledging to
[e]nsure the transparency of the negotiating process, including
through publication of the preliminary draft FTAA Agreement in
the four official languages as soon as possible and the dissemination
of additional information on the progress of negotiations. 265
The negotiating text of the FTAA was released three months later,
and two subsequent revisions were released in the days preceding the
annual meetings of trade ministers that punctuate the negotiating pro-
visability of any potential free trade agreement. At the Mar del Plata Summit in 2005, the four
full member states of MERCOSUR-Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay-joined Vene-
zuela in opposing continued negotiations for an FTAA. The other participating states agreed to
a U.S. proposal to resume negotiations, and this resulted in a statement that "some member
states" remain optimistic about the FTAA. See Declaration of Mar del Plata, supra note 102, T
9A. At the 2009 summit in Port of Spain, the question of an FTAA was not even mentioned in
the final document. Port of Spain Declaration, supra note 98.
263. Second Summit of the Americas, Santiago Summit Declaration and Plan of Action, 37
I.L.M. 947, 951 (1998).
264. Information about the Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation
of Civil Society (SOC) and its proceedings can be found on the official FTAA web site at http://
www.ftaa-alca.org/SPCOMMICOMMCSE.ASP (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
265. Quebec Plan of Action, supra note 34, at 14.
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cess. 266 The Quebec Summit Plan of Action also includes a pledge by
states to
[f]oster through their respective national dialogue mechanisms and
through appropriate FTAA mechanisms, a process of increasing and
sustained communication with civil society to ensure that it has a
clear perception of the development of the FTAA negotiating pro-
cess [and to] invite civil society to continue to contribute to the
FTAA process.267
While this language appears partly aimed at marketing the FTAA to
civil society-communications are intended to "ensure" clear percep-
tions rather than to invite meaningful input-it also includes a call for
non-state actors to contribute to the process. These contributions
have largely been managed by the SOC, although the negotiating pro-
cess at trade ministerial meetings has also been opened to some
extent.
The SOC created a public input mechanism that invited NGOs to
make "submissions" on any area of concern that was raised by the
proposed FTAA.268 This mechanism has been criticized for being a
somewhat one-way "post office box" approach to public input that
creates no real basis for dialogue. 269 Nevertheless, since its inception,
it has evolved to some extent, and the SOC now collates and summa-
rizes submissions for trade delegations, so that at least this one-way
flow of information is a bit more accessible. Between 2003 and 2004,
the SOC also hosted a series of three "issue meetings" on agriculture,
services, and intellectual property rights. 270 While these themes re-
flected the concerns of governments more than those of the NGO
community-NGO concerns relate more to environmental, labor, and
other social issues-the meetings at least provided an opportunity for
direct interaction between non-state actors and responsible govern-
ment officials, including negotiators and representatives of technical
ministries. The SOC was also charged with designing a proposal for a
266. The current draft text can be found on the official FTAA website at http://www.ftaa-alca.
org/FTAADraft03/Indexe.asp (last visited June 27, 2009).
267. Quebec Plan of Action, supra note 34, at 14.
268. For the most recent iteration of this invitation, see Free Trade Area of the Ams., Comm.
of Gov't Representatives on the Participation of Civil Soc'y, Open and Ongoing Invitation to
Civil Society in FTAA Participating Countries, FTAA.soc/15/Rev.5 (Mar. 31, 2004), available at
http://www.ftaa-alca.org/spcomm/SOC/INVITATION/SOC15r5_e.asp. (last visited June 27,
2009).
269. See CENTRO ECUADORIANO DE DERECHO AMBIENTAL 2003, TOWARDS CIVIL SOCIETY
PARTICIPATION IN THE AMERICAS: MEMOIRS OF THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT WORKSHOPS IN
THE QUITO MINISTERIAL 75-76 [hereinafter CEDA/FFLA PROCEEDINGS] (copy on file with
author).
270. Summaries of the meeting agendas and results can be found at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/
SpComm/SOC/Thema e.asp (last visited June 27, 2009).
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"civil society consultative committee within the institutional frame-
work of the FTAA," as called for in the Eighth Ministerial Meeting in
Miami in 2003,271 but efforts to develop the proposal have not pro-
ceeded since the FTAA negotiation process was suspended.
The last two FTAA Ministerial Meetings, in Quito in 2002 and in
Miami in 2003, also provided opportunities for direct interaction be-
tween trade negotiators and interested civil society participants. In
both cases, the issues that NGOs brought to the table were related to
the broader social concerns raised by the F-IAA proposal. In Quito,
trade ministers held a brief direct meeting with non-state actors who
had participated in three separate non-governmental forums. The
first, on indigenous and labor concerns, was hosted by a loose coali-
tion called the Hemispheric Social Alliance.2 72 The second, on envi-
ronmental sustainability, was hosted by two Ecuadorian NGOs and
their counterparts from the region.273 The third, on trade policy more
generally, was hosted by a Latin American coalition of parliamentari-
ans.274 In Miami, a coalition of NGOs from the region organized a
forum called the Americas Trade and Sustainable Development Fo-
rum (ATSDF) and, at the invitation of the Office of the United States
Trade Representative, hosted a three-day workshop inside the "secur-
ity perimeter" that was established to contain street protests.275 The
ATSDF included parallel workshops on nine areas: trade and agricul-
ture; trade, democracy, and human rights; trade and environment;
trade and smaller economies; trade, participation, and access; trade
and sustainable livelihoods; trade, corruption, and transparency; trade,
knowledge, and intellectual property rights; and trade and invest-
ment.276 More than three hundred NGO participants from over
twenty countries attended, and representatives from trade ministries
of at least eight countries were present for at least part of the
proceedings. 277
271. Free Trade Area of the Americas: Eighth Trade Ministerial Meeting, Miami, Fla., Nov.
20, 2003, Ministerial Declaration, 28, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Ministerials/Miami/
Miami e.asp (last visited June 27, 2009).
272. Dannenmaier, supra note 15, at 1101-03. For a more complete description of NGO par-
ticipation in both the Quito and Miami ministerial meetings, see id. at 1089-13.
273. Id. at 1089-90.
274. Id. at 1101-02.
275. Id. at 1105; see also John Audley & Scott Vaughan, Civil Society and the November 2003
Miami Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Ministerial, (Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace Briefing Paper) (May 21, 2003), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/
events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=619 (last visited Sept. 27, 2009)




While each of these mechanisms is imperfect, and although consid-
erable obstacles still prevent the opening of any future regional trade
negotiations to meaningful participation by non-state actors, a frame-
work is evolving that offers a greater degree of access than can be
found in comparable negotiations related to other trade accords.
D. NGO Accreditation Rules for the OAS
Non-state actors have for many years worked in an informal man-
ner with the OAS and its technical units, but until the 1990s, no formal
status was afforded to NGOs before the political bodies of the organi-
zation.278 The Canadian government became interested in creating an
NGO accreditation mechanism, and in 1994 made a formal request to
the OAS Permanent Council that the question of NGO status be stud-
ied.279 The request was approved, and in the ensuing years, Canada
worked through the summit process and through the organs of the
OAS to create an accreditation mechanism. 280
In 1994, the OAS began slowly creating a Working Group to Study
the Possibility of Granting Status to Non-governmental Organizations
(NGO's) in the OAS through the Committee on Juridical and Political
Affairs of the Permanent Council.281 The Working Group catalogued
NGOs with which the OAS had cooperative agreements, interviewed
OAS Secretariat staff about their work with NGOs, and looked to
comparative examples of NGO participation in some UN confer-
ences.282 Yet the Working Group took over two years to conclude its
efforts, offering a final report to the Committee on Juridical and Polit-
278. In 1971, the OAS issued a set of standards that approved relations with NGOs willing to
provide advisory services or carry out programs for the OAS. But the standards included no
reference to the status of NGOs as interest groups that might seek to influence the programs or
policies of the OAS or its member states. OAS G.A. Res. 57, 10th Plen. Sess., 13-22, OAS
Doc. OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.109 rev. 1 (Apr. 22, 1971), available at http://www.oas.org/legal/english/
CoopRelations/CoopRelationsl.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
279. Org. of Am. States, Permanent Council, Note from the Permanent Mission of Canada on
the "Study of the Possible Granting of Status to Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs) at the
OAS," OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. G CP/doc.2486/94 (May 2, 1994), available at http://www.civil-
society.oas.org/Permanent%20Council/CP-DOC-2486-94-eng.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
280. The author discussed these efforts with Canadian representatives to the OAS, and with
other OAS officials in the course of discussions regarding Canada's accreditation proposal in
1999. Some of the efforts are described infra notes 290-294 and accompanying text.
281. See Org. of Am. States, Comm. on Juridical and Political Affairs, Working Group to
Study the Possibility of Granting Status to Non-governmental Organizations (NGO's) in the OAS,
OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G CP/CAJP-1005/95 (Mar. 23, 1995), available at http://www.civil-society.




ical Affairs in July 1997.283 Rather than offering a plan for NGO ac-
creditation, the report recommended new measures that could have
limited the potential for NGO consultations on substantive issues, at
least where those consultations were sought with technical bodies of
the OAS. 284
With progress on NGO accreditation stalled in the OAS technical
and political organs, Canada was able to turn to the summit process.
Summits had produced written commitments to increase civil society
participation at the regional level,28 5 as well as a growing epistemic
community of NGOs that were engaged in OAS processes and inter-
ested in greater participation. In June 1998, at the OAS General As-
sembly meeting following the Working Group report, a Canadian
proposal was approved that went well beyond the modest and poten-
tially limiting proposals of the Committee on Juridical and Political
Affairs. 286 The proposal, Resolution 1539, made specific reference to
the Miami, Santa Cruz, and Santiago Summit language about the "im-
283. See Org. of Am. States, Comm. on Juridical and Political Affairs, Report by the Commit-
tee on Juridical and Political Affairs on the Status of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
in the OAS, OEA/Ser.G CP/doc.2946/97 (July 11, 1997) [hereinafter Report on Juridical and
Political Affairs], available at http://www.civil-society.oas.org/Permanent%20Council/CP-doc-
2946-97-Dixon.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
284. Id. It is not clear that the Committee intended to propose limitations on NGO access,
and in fact its report lauded the relations that NGOs generally had with the OAS. But the
Committee's draft resolution failed to create any accreditation program and did not speak to
how NGOs might become more actively engaged with the political bodies of the OAS. It fo-
cused instead on the OAS Technical Secretariat. In addition, the draft resolution proposed that
the General Secretariat "draft practical guidelines to ensure consistency and enhancement of
relations between the OAS General Secretariat and NGOs, which include: (i) the definition of
selection criteria with regard to NGO participation in programs, projects and activities; (ii) fi-
nancing; and (iii) document dissemination." Id. app. 2 2. Defining "selection criteria" to "en-
sure consistency and enhancement or relations" reads more like an effort to turn NGOs into an
efficient contractor force for the technical branches of the OAS than an effort to assure robust
participation by non-state actors in the workings of the OAS. See OAS Permanent Council CP
Res. 704, OEA/Ser.G CP/RES. 704 (1129/97) (July 24, 1997), available at http://www.civil-
society.oas.org/Permanent%20Council/CP-RES-704.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2009). This lan-
guage was endorsed verbatim by the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs. See Org. of
Am. States, Comm. on Juridical & Political Affairs, Report by the Comm. on Juridical & Political
Affairs on the Status of Non-Governmental Organizations in the OAS, OAS Doc. OEASer.G,
CP/doc.2946/97 (July 11, 1997).
285. See discussion supra Part IV.
286. OAS G.A. Res. 1539, OAS Doc. AG/RES. 1539 (XXVIII-0/98) (June 2, 1998) [hereinaf-
ter Resolution 1539]; see also Santiago Plan of Action, supra note 115. The language cited in
Resolution 1539 was drawn from a section of the Santiago Plan of Action that dealt with civil
society. The same section called upon states to "draw upon existing initiatives that promote
increased participation of civil society in public issues, such as relevant successful experiences
from the National Councils for Sustainable Development and the Inter-American Strategy for
Public Participation," which called for greater openness to civil society participation at the na-
tional level. Id. at 8. See ISP Strategy Document, supra note 220, at 10 1 b-c, 17.
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portance of civil society," and to Santiago Summit language about the
role of the OAS as a "forum for the exchange of experiences and in-
formation. '287 In essence, Resolution 1539 re-tasked the Permanent
Council to address the issue of civil society access to the OAS. The
General Assembly resolved
[t]o instruct the Permanent Council to examine ways to increase the
degree to which appropriate nongovernmental organizations and
civil society organizations may become more closely involved in,
and contribute to, the activities of the Organization, and ways to
implement the tasks entrusted to the OAS in the Santiago Plan of
Action with respect to civil society. In this process, representatives
of civil society organizations may be asked for their views on the
matter.288
The Permanent Council was also instructed to report on progress at
the following General Assembly meeting in June 1999.289
Acting pursuant to Resolution 1539, Canada convened an informal
working group of NGOs and government representatives in Washing-
ton to make recommendations for an NGO accreditation frame-
work.290 The group examined accreditation practices at the UN and
discussed how to design an accreditation program for the OAS that
would provide maximum openness for NGOs while creating some lim-
its that would allow governments to constrain participation by groups
operating contrary to the principles of the OAS Charter, such as the
Shining Path rebels in Peru.291 The group also discussed how to en-
sure access to working documents for accredited organizations, how to
finance costs associated with the program, and how to ensure that an
accreditation system did not discourage or limit existing avenues of
access by NGOs, particularly to the technical units of the OAS. 292
The results of this work, including draft guidelines for accreditation,
were presented to a Special Joint Working Group of the Permanent
Council and CIDI on the Strengthening and Modernization of the
OAS, chaired by Canada. 293 This Special Joint Working Group, which
was formed to address a broader range of institutional reform issues
within the OAS, reported favorably on the accreditation of NGOs to
287. Resolution 1539, supra note 286.
288. Id. 1 1.
289. Id. 91 2.
290. The author participated in this informal working group and has his notes of the meetings,
along with copies of draft accreditation proposals, on file.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. The author discussed these results with representatives of the Permanent Mission of Ca-
nada to the OAS.
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the OAS in a presentation to the General Assembly through the Per-
manent Council. 294
In response to the report, the General Assembly approved a resolu-
tion in 1999 (Resolution 1661) that created a Committee on Civil Soci-
ety Participation in OAS Activities within the Permanent Council and
that instructed the Permanent Council "to prepare, by way of that
committee, and bearing in mind the attachment to the report
presented by the Permanent Council, guidelines for civil society par-
ticipation in OAS activities, for adoption before December 31,
1999."295 In support of Resolution 1661, the General Assembly
quoted at length from language of the Miami and Santiago
Summits. 296
The Permanent Council created a Civil Society Committee in the
following weeks and issued accreditation guidelines on December 15,
1999.297 The Civil Society Committee's functions were later merged
with the OAS Office of Summit Follow-up and are now managed by
the OAS Department of International Affairs within the Secretariat of
External Relations. 298 The OAS accreditation program and summit-
related issues are now managed by the Permanent Council Committee
on Inter-American Summits Management and Civil Society Participa-
tion in OAS Activities (CISC). 2 9 9 The CISC's functions are defined as
follows:
a. With respect to the Summit process:
i. To coordinate OAS activities in support of the Summits of
the Americas process;
ii. To coordinate follow-up and implementation activities re-
lating to mandates assigned to the Organization by the
Summits;
294. See Org. of Am. States, Special Joint Working Group of the Permanent Council and the
Inter-American Council for Integral Development on the Strengthening and Modernization of
the OAS, Discussion Paper: The OAS and Civil Society, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.T/VII, GETC/
FORMOEA-101/99 rev. 4 (May 21, 1999), available at http://www.summit-americas.org/Reform
%20Group/getc101-99.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2009); OAS G.A. Res. 1661, OAS Doc. AG/RES.
1661 (XXIX-0/99) (June 7, 1999), available at http://www.oas.org/juridicofEngish/ga-res99/
eres1661.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
295. OAS G.A. Res. 1661, OAS Doc. AG/RES. 1661 (XXIX-O/99) (June 7, 1999).
296. Id.
297. OAS G.A. Res. 759, OAS Doc. OEA/SER.G, CP/RES.759 (1217/99) (Dec. 15, 1999),
available at http://www.civil-society.oas.org/Permanent%20Council/CP-RES-759.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 2, 2009).
298. The work of the Civil Society Committee and its relationship to the summit process is
described on its web page at http://www.civil-society.oas.org/.
299. The Permanent Council Committee on Inter-American Summits Management and Civil
Society Participation in OAS Activities (CISC) maintains a web site at http://www.oas.org/conse
jo/CUMBRES/ (last visited July 30, 2009).
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iii. To request and receive contributions from civil society, re-
lating to its participation in the Summit process, for consid-
eration by the Summit Implementation Review Group
(SIRG);
iv. To study topics relating to the Summit process that are as-
signed to it by the Council or the General Assembly and to
make recommendations thereon to the Permanent Council;
v. To consider the reports prepared by the Executive Secreta-
riat for the Summit Process and the technical dependency
responsible for ministerial meetings and other sectoral
meetings linked to the Summits process.
b. With respect to civil society participation in OAS activities:
i. To implement the Guidelines for the Participation of Civil
Society Organizations in OAS Activities and to present to
the Permanent Council such amendments as the Commit-
tee deems pertinent;
ii. To design, implement, and evaluate the necessary strate-
gies to increase and facilitate civil society participation in
OAS activities;
iii. To promote the strengthening of relations established be-
tween civil society organizations and the bodies and depen-
dencies of the OAS within the scope of the functions
conferred upon the Permanent Council by the OAS
Charter;
iv. To study matters relating to civil society participation in
OAS activities that are presented to it by civil society orga-
nizations or entrusted to it by the Permanent Council or
the General Assembly and to make recommendations
thereon to the Permanent Council;
v. To analyze and transmit to the Permanent Council applica-
tions presented by civil society organizations to the Secre-
tary General to participate in OAS activities.300
The merging of summit and civil society liaison functions reflects the
fact that the OAS agenda, at the broadest political level, is increas-
ingly driven by the summit process, and that the facilitation and man-
agement of input from non-state actors at the OAS and in the summit
process are administratively and institutionally parallel. 30 1
300. Org. of Am. States, Permanent Council, Rules of Procedure of the Permanent Council of
the OAS, at 6, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G, CP/doc.1112/80 rev. 4 corr. 1 (Aug. 27, 2003), available at
http://scm.oas.org/doc-public/ENGLISHIHIST_03/CP11732E07.DOC (last visited Aug. 2, 2009);
see also Org. of Am. States, Permanent Council, Work Plan of the Committee on Inter-American
Summits Management and Civil Society Participation in OAS Activities (2005-2006), OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser. G, CP/CISC-183/05 rev. 1 (Sept. 26, 2005) (outlining the commitment to engage civil
society actors as part of summit follow up and implementation activities in furtherance of OAS
support role in summit process).
301. An examination of the OAS Civil Society web site demonstrates how these functions
overlap. It also shows how important partnerships with NGOs and NGO networks have become
to the Summit process and to the OAS. See http://www.civil-society.oas.org/ (last visited Sept.
21, 2009).
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VII. JURISGENERATIVE POTENTIAL OF SUMMITS
These four case studies show that summits advanced the interna-
tional lawmaking process in the Inter-American System, and in some
cases they produced international legal commitments that even a strict
formalist could recognize as positive law. Inter-American summits
nurtured institutional reforms both in the process for negotiating a
regional trade accord and the process for engaging non-state actors in
the OAS. Summits also gave rise to the IADC, which has positive
legal features. While these instruments and institutional reforms have
yet to be fully deployed, they owe their genesis to summits and the
unique framework for access and interaction that summits offer.
Evidence of a shift in state practice tied to a summit commitment
can be seen in the fact that both Argentina and Mexico enacted laws
on access to information in the years that followed the formulation of
the Inter-American Strategy for Public Participation which was ap-
proved in 2000.302 The call for a domestic commitment to greater ac-
cess to information was one of the principal recommendations of the
ISP that emerged from the summit process.30 3 It cannot be claimed
that the ISP alone motivated these changes, but some influence can
certainly be posited. 30 4
From a legal process perspective, summits play a role in determin-
ing "international society's values" and thus legitimize and substanti-
302. See Decreto No. 1172/03, Dec. 3, 2003, B.O. (Arg.); Ley Federal de Transparencia y Ac-
ceso a la Informaci6n Ptiblica Gubernamental, [Federal Law of Transparency and Access to
Public Governmental Information], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O], 11 de Junio de 2002
(Mex.).
303. See ISP Strategy Document, supra note 220, at 5-6.
304. As discussed supra notes 224-225, the author served as a member of the Technical Advi-
sory Group that helped shape the ISP process and draft its language over the course of two
years, and in that capacity worked closely with foreign and environment ministry officials from
Argentina and Mexico, who regularly monitored the process of developing the ISP. As dis-
cussed supra note 225, the Mexican government hosted the final meeting in which the language
of the ISP was debated. Argentine and Mexican NGOs also played a prominent role in formu-
lating the ISP, and the participation of non-state actors from Mexico was facilitated by the loca-
tion of the final drafting meeting: Mexico City. Participant lists of ISP meetings and notes of
meetings, including the Mexico City meeting, are on file with author. While causal claims cannot
be proved, the participation of government officials and non-state actors from both countries as
an integral part of the ISP development process over the course of two years leaves open at least
the possibility that they were influenced, inspired, or at least informed by the process. The ISP
certainly facilitated the formation and strengthening of an epistemic community of governmental
and non-governmental actors concerned with greater public access to development decision-
making in both of these countries, and connected them with others from throughout the region
with similar interests. While offering proof of the mechanisms through which such a community
worked is beyond the scope of this Article, the NGO community's potential to affect policy
outcomes should not be discounted.
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ate normative claims. 30 5 Summits are highly public events where
government leaders seek both to affirm and to define societal values
through dialogue and consensus. Non-state actors reflecting a broad
cross-section of civil society collaborate in summit preparatory meet-
ings and agenda setting. At times, governments invite non-state ac-
tors to participate directly as ex oficio members of negotiating
teams.306 Even some arenas of public protest against summits or their
agendas have been funded and sanctioned by government. 30 7 This
speaks less of co-option than of an effort to engage interested parties,
including vocal dissidents, in the dialogue on regional values and poli-
cies. The most radical dissenters-those who outright reject summit
initiatives and turn to street rallies or violence to convey their mes-
sage-also use summit venues to stage their theatre, thus implicitly
acknowledging that even outsiders find some utility in the broader
summit process.308
305. For a discussion of new international legal process theory, see Mary Ellen O'Connell,
New International Legal Process, in RATNER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 2, at 84-86; see also
Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L.
REV. 181, 183-86 (1996) (discussing transnational legal process as the "theory and practice of
how public and private actors . . . interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and
international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of transnational
law"). While the case studies discussed above focus on regional policy and international norms,
the impact of summits on domestic policy is also worth exploring. An argument might be made
that summit attention to participatory democratic mechanisms has led to increased interest in
these mechanisms at the national level, a claim that transnational process theorists such as Har-
old Koh might find interesting. See id. at 205 ("Once nations begin to interact, a complex pro-
cess occurs, whereby international legal norms seep into, are internalized, and become
embedded in domestic legal and political processes.").
306. The author has spoken with several individuals who have served in this capacity, includ-
ing individuals invited by the governments of Canada, Germany, and the United States. See also
UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board Communique (January 2009) at 2, available at http://
www.unaidspcbngo.org/pcb/blog/UNAIDS PCBNGO-Delegation-Communique-onthe23rd
_PCB-mtgjfinal%20(1).doc (last visited October 31, 2009) (noting that some states included
civil society in their own national delegations at a UN conference on HIV in 2008); Taking Issue:
The Sustainable Development Issues Network Volume 5, Issue 10 (April 15 2005) at 1, available
at http://www.bpwnl.nl/archief/th4_sust/050415-TI.doc (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (noting that,
since the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, "the Dutch have included a
Youth, a Women and a NGO representative in their national delegation").
307. Canada partially funded the People's Summit as an alternative to the official summits
both in Santiago in 1998 and Quebec City in 2001. Interviews by author with representatives of
Canada's Permanent Mission to the OAS. President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela was a keynote
speaker at the People's Summit in Mar del Plata in 2005. See Termin6 la Cumbre de los Pueblos,
NACION (Arg.), Nov. 4, 2005, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=753463
(last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
308. For example, regional firebrand Hugo Chavez, President of Venezuela, used the occasion
of the 2005 summit in Mar del Plata, Argentina, to stage a massive public rally outside of the
formal diplomatic proceedings. The rally was aimed at generating public sentiment in favor of
his own government's policy positions and against those of his favorite target, the United States.
See Elisabeth Bumiller, In Latin America, Messy Foray for Bush, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 6,
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The cases also suggest that summits promote conforming behavior
among state agencies and regional organizations through interaction
and the internalization of norms.30 9 Linking these institutions to civil
society actors lays a foundation for cooperative follow-up, and it pro-
duces expectations among societal demandeurs who are in a position
to monitor implementation and promote further progress.310 This
may strengthen the propensity of states to comply with obligations by
putting NGOs in a better position to perform "parallel and supple-
mentary" monitoring functions. 311
Summits also provide a mechanism that can reinforce state efforts
to advance policy goals when these goals are both consistent with the
value-laden currents of the summit process and supported by the sum-
mits' epistemic communities. Peru, for example, sought regional affir-
mation to secure the position of its elected leaders at a critical
moment in its history, and its interim President, Valentfn Paniagua,
used the summit process to advance the IADC and bolster fragile do-
mestic institutions after eight years of autocratic rule. 312 After its for-
mer President, Alberto Fujimori, had threatened to return and rule
his country, Paniagua used a moment of democratic respite to secure
some assurances from Peru's neighbors, through the IADC, against
the possibility that Fujimori might make good on his threat. Peru was
substantially aided by the historical summit rhetoric of democracy and
an array of pro-democracy groups and like-minded countries that had
coalesced around the summit process to form a supportive epistemic
2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/06/world/americas/O6iht-letter.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 31, 2009); Jordana Timerman, Chdvez and Maradona Lead Massive Rebuke of Bush,
NATION, Nov. 5, 2005, available at http://www.thenation.com.
309. For a discussion of the importance of these factors in shaping normative responses, see
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2400 (1991).
310. Even more aspirational statements of principle embodied in summit commitments can
promote expectations, which, over time, can be converted to hard commitments through the
efforts of interested state and non-state actors. These statements formed part of the basis for
claims for greater access to the FTAA negotiation process by organizers of the Americas Trade
and Sustainable Development Forum (ATSDF), who were able to cite summit commitments
dating back to 1994 in their effort to open up the trade ministerial meetings in Quito in 2002 and
Miami in 2003. See supra notes 263-267 and accompanying text. Non-state actors involved in
the summit process have also been involved in summit follow-up projects, which monitor compli-
ance with summit mandates. See, e.g., THE SUMMITS MUST NOT END Up As EMPTY PROMISES:
HEMISPHERIC REPORT 2006-2008, (2009) available at http://www.civil-society.oas.org/docu-
ments/123_ENG informe%20hemisfC3%A9rico%20(inglC3%A9s).pdf (last visited Oct.
31, 2009) (report of a summit commitment monitoring project implemented by Corporaci6n Par-
ticipa, among others, and funded by the U.S. government through the National Endowment for
Democracy, and by the Canadian International Development Agency and the OAS).
311. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 28, at 250-53.
312. See supra notes 243-255 and accompanying text.
2009]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1
community. 313 While the IADC remains a relatively young instru-
ment, and it has yet to be tested by a returning exile like Fujimori, it
did appear to operate as designed in the first two cases that arose after
its adoption.314 More recently, following the military ouster of Hon-
duran President Ernesto Zelaya in June 2009, IADC procedures were
invoked and OAS member states presented a largely unified front by
suspending Honduras membership and by cutting off aid and other
financial flows to the country. 315
Examples such as the IADC also show the utility of summits as
proactive mechanisms that allow states to move from a problem-ori-
ented, reactive mode to one of setting goals and aspirations. While
the IADC grew partly out of Peru's experience with Fujimori, and in
that sense interest in such a mechanism can be seen as a reaction,
broader regional support for the IADC can be seen as a proactive
move to create a framework for response and to create disincentives
to future democratic disruptions. Canada's effort to create a mecha-
nism for NGO accreditation within the OAS is another example of a
proactive approach. It was not a response to any crisis or any new
demand on the part of NGOs. Until Canada began pushing to formal-
ize access, NGOs that had historically chosen to work with the OAS
or to seek to influence its policies had found informal avenues and
313. See Haas, supra note 3, at 569-70 (describing the idea of "epistemic communities").
314. The IADC was invoked in response to the coup attempt in Venezuela in April 2002. See
Denis Paradis, Secretary of State for Latin America and Africa, Statement to the 29th Special
Session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (Apr. 18, 2002), availa-
ble at http://www.oas.org/speeches/speech.asp?sCodigo=02-0347 (last visited Aug. 2, 2009). It
was not invoked in Haiti in February 2004, despite the arguments by some, including Jean Ber-
trand Aristide, that what took place was effectively a coup. See Mark Weisbrot, Co-Director for
the Center of Economic and Policy Research, Statement to OAS Meeting Between Civil Society
Organizations, the Secretary General, and Heads of Delegations (June 6, 2005), available at
http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/news2005/0606-20.htm (last visited July 30,
2009).
315. At the time this Article went to press there was still no consensus resolution of the con-
troversy surrounding Zelaya's ouster, although it appeared that OAS member states, including
the United States, were taking a wait-and-see approach and were poised to recognize the results
of a planned November 29, 2009 election. Mary Beth Sheridan, Honduras Accord is on Verge of
Collapse; Ousted President Says U.S. Lacks Commitment to Reinstatement, WASH. POST Nov. 12,
2009, at A3. A full analysis of how the IADC worked in the wake of the Honduran coup (or
not) will need to be conducted with the benefit of time, more complete information, and hind-
sight, but it appears even from contemporaneous and incomplete reports that the instrument
worked at least in some of the ways it was planned to work by providing a framework for re-
gional response and coordination-and for normative pressure. The Charter did not prevent a
coup, but that was not its purpose. Instead it provided a basis for regional democracies to speak
and act with a degree of purpose and to seek some measure of unity through a deliberative
process.
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mechanisms to do so. 316 Canada sought broader participation in OAS
political bodies and regularized access to documentation, among other
things, as a means of improving the system at a time when it had the
luxury to do so, and it found an advantage in working through the
summit process and its network of democracy groups, instead of work-
ing solely through the OAS itself, which had been historically resistant
to an accreditation scheme.317
Inter-American summits have also helped place the negotiation of
prescriptive agreements in the broader context of regional values. In
the case of the FTAA, summit commitments called for attention to
regional social concerns that would otherwise be anathema to a tradi-
tional trade negotiation.318 While many have argued against the
FTAA, and indeed trade agreements in general, as a neo-colonial in-
strument that will benefit the wealthy at the expense of the poor,319
summit instruments have at least called for some effort to balance ec-
onomic goals with social concerns, and they have lent support to those
who would bring social concerns to the negotiating table. Nascent ef-
forts to open the FTAA negotiating process to non-state actors can
also be traced to explicit commitments made through the summit pro-
cess.320 While the current breakdown in FTAA negotiations reflects a
deeper global policy dispute about the terms under which multilateral
trade accords will proceed,32' the summit process has offered a stage
upon which the issues at the heart of the quarrel can be publicly con-
tested, and it may eventually provide a vehicle to resolve contests that
otherwise would have no forum.
316. See Report on Juridical and Political Affairs, supra note 283, at 4-6; see also Org. of Am.
States, Permanent Council, Nongovernmental Organizations With Which the Organization of
American States Has Established Cooperative Relations, OAS Doc. CA/CAJP-962/94 (Sept. 1,
2004), available at http://www.civil-society.oas.org/Permanent%20CounciVCP-CAJP-962-94-
septiembre%20de%201994-eng.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2009) (describing the range of coopera-
tion between NGOs and various OAS organs prior to the creation of a formal accreditation
mechanism).
317. Recall that efforts at reform through internal processes had proceeded at a snail's pace
and produced a proposal that was more of a step backward than forward. See supra notes
281-284 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 268-276 and accompanying text; see also Miami Plan of Action, supra
note 101, 9(2) (calling for trade expansion to be pursued in a manner consistent with environ-
mental policies and concerns for workers' rights).
319. See Dannenmaier, supra note 15, at 1087-89.
320. See Miami Plan of Action, supra note 101, . 9(2).
321. FTAA negotiations became stalled-along with global WTO negotiations-over disputes
about agricultural subsidies and industrial market access that appeared to defy compromise in
the Doha round. See So, What Next?, 12 BRIDGES, Dec. 2008-Jan. 2009, at 1, 1 ("WTO Director
General Pascal Lamy told the [WTO] membership on 12 December that his consultations with




The inter-American summit process has also promoted interna-
tional policy transparency more broadly, both through the access it
provides to non-state actors seeking to monitor and influence the
agenda and through the stage it sets for leaders to carry their policy
messages to a broader audience. The former is facilitated in part be-
cause the process has been open from the outset, and because non-
state actors have found ways to engage delegations and promote their
agendas.32 2 The latter is facilitated in part because summit commit-
ments are negotiated with a view toward a broader audience and be-
cause language is less technical and more accessible. 323 The effort to
explain policy priorities through public international forums has the
potential to be transformative. At the least, it opens up opportunities
to engage the public in new and potentially meaningful ways. Gov-
ernment officials and civil society leaders recognize that audiences for
summits are members of their diverse societies, and they thus seek to
make policy goals and principles transparent. The downside, of
course, is additional precatory language that is vague, aspirational,
and unenforceable. But this language, though broad and aspirational,
can serve to clarify and reinforce "international society's values ' 324 in
a way that more technical treaties often cannot and these values are
an important touchstone for norms that guide state behavior.
Institutional theorists should recognize inter-American summits as
a valuable tool of international law because summits rely heavily on
cooperative models and institution building.325 In each of the cases
described above, there is evidence that commitments of the inter-
American summit process have resulted in administrative changes and
institutional adaptations at the regional level. Summits may be
viewed either as supporting existing institutions-they certainly
breathed new life into the OAS in the past decade-or as being insti-
tutions in their own right. In either case, summits potentially have
322. See supra notes 103-134 and accompanying text
323. See supra notes 135-202 and accompanying text
324. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 334, 336
(1999). O'Connell describes the relationship between legal process theory to international legal
process theory and explains that, for legal process theorists, "acceptable answers" about law's
purposes "should be guided by society's values." Id. She concludes that new international legal
process theory "would advocate knowledge of the legal system and valuing institutional settle-
ment in line with international society's values." Id. at 339.
325. For a discussion of institutionalist theory, see Kenneth Abbott, International Relations
Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, in RATNER
& SLAUGHTER, supra note 2, at 134-35; see also Robert 0. Keohane, International Relations and
International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 487, 489 (1997) ("The 'instrumentalist optic'
focuses on interests and argues that rules and norms will matter only if they affect the calcula-
tions of interests by agents. International institutions.., can make a difference, but only when
their rules create specific opportunities and impose constraints which affect state interests.").
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independent effects on behavior by changing the context of interac-
tion, facilitating negotiation and implementation, reducing transaction
costs, 3 2 6 providing constituent-derived information, inserting expert
actors, and facilitating the pooling of information.
Inter-American summits have also constructed frameworks for in-
stitutional cooperation. Some of these frameworks have been formal-
ized through the OAS system, such as the Summit Implementation
Review Group 327 and the Inter-American Working Group on Sustain-
able Development.328 Some cooperative frameworks remain informal
and fluid. 329 Summits serve to motivate and facilitate this cooperation
and to clarify the cooperative agenda. They also offer a mechanism
for ratifying institutional advancements and arrangements that
emerge through the cooperative process.
Finally, inter-American summits provide a potentially important ne-
gotiating space for heads of state, and for their advisors and agencies
in the process of negotiating summit agendas, which might create
strong inter-personal relationships and networks. These interactions
may promote greater trust and affinity among participants because
they are not crisis driven, and in most cases they do not involve high
stakes. In this respect, the broader, more aspirational nature of sum-
mit commitments gives diplomats an opportunity to interact and work
toward consensus on statements of principle and programs of cooper-
ation. This forward-looking, relatively positive negotiation space
might help build relationships among and even informal networks of
officials who might serve to foster deeper collaborative efforts and to
diffuse tensions and facilitate progress when crises arise.
326. Of course it is possible, perhaps likely, that additional process features will result in some
increased transaction costs, particularly in the short term, as mechanisms and institutional infra-
structure are created to manage the process. But these costs should be offset by the increased
animation of a public that can help shape and implement policy.
327. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
328. This is a group of inter-governmental organizations including OAS technical units con-
cerned with sustainable development issues that was convened by the Head of the Unit for
Sustainable Development and Environment (now the OAS Department of Sustainable Develop-
ment). See Org. of Am. States, Working Group on Sustainable Development, Work Schedule of
the CEPCIDI Working Group on Sustainable Development, October/December 2006, OAS Doc.
Ser.W/IV CEPCIDI/GTIDS/doc.62/06 (describing Working Group plans for a ten-year follow up
on the Santa Cruz Summit).
329. Examples include the Civil Society Task Force of the Esquel Group Foundation, which
convened monthly meetings of state and non-state actors to discuss regional issues, the inter-
American summit process in Washington, D.C., and the Partners of the Americas Civil Society
Forum, which has hosted regional workshops and internet forums relating to the regional sum-
mit process. See, e.g, Esquel Group, Task Force, http://www.esquel.org/taskforce (last visited
July 30, 2009); Advances and Challenges Facing Civil Society Within the Framework of the Sum-
mits of the Americas, http://www.partners.net/images/partners/EN/Documents/PDF/monterrey-




The cases reviewed in this Article offer examples of state and non-
state actors working in the inter-American system, and they demon-
strate unique participatory aspects of the summit process that advance
policy and normative goals. The cases suggest that inter-American
summits have a discernable normative push, at least in part because
they exhibit process features such as transparency, openness, and in-
clusive agenda setting that emphasize value formation and collabora-
tion among state and non-state constituencies. Inter-American
summits can be seen to serve a legitimizing and value-internalization
function that is meaningful in international lawmaking, even when di-
rect outcomes are not hard law.
By pursuing democratic objectives within a process that itself has
democratic features, inter-American summits have produced a mutu-
ally reinforcing phenomenon: increasing their own jurisgenerative po-
tential even as they expand public access to the traditionally insular
world of international decision making. Given that the discourse of
democracy has become increasingly salient in the Western Hemi-
sphere, and globally, the importance of this phenomenon should not
be discounted.
The case studies from the inter-American region demonstrate that
head of state summits can satisfy the democracy concerns that animate
both access critics and access proponents. Where summits include the
type of process features that have become integral to the summit of
the Americas system-open consultations, information sharing, coop-
erative dialogue, and government financial support-they engage and
build epistemic communities that are concerned with summit agenda
items, such as the environment, healthcare, women's rights, and the
preservation and expansion of democratic domestic institutions. Sum-
mits of this type do not represent a move toward a formal, electoral
"new order," but they do offer an open, transparent, and network-
driven model of deliberative democracy. Yet the outcomes are
neither forced upon state leaders nor formulated behind their backs.
In every case, state officials are at the center of negotiations and heads
of state and government sign final commitments. Where necessary,
state legislators still ratify or adopt outcomes that require changes in
domestic law.
Thus, despite greater openness and participation, states do not com-
promise fundamental claims about decision-making authority. In fact,
as the Peru and Canada case studies show, state leaders often initiate
proposals that are developed and strengthened through the summit
process in a way that might not otherwise be possible. The process
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itself-which takes place within a supportive and reinforcing episte-
mic community-demonstrably advances state goals and outcomes,
and the active participation of domestic constituencies helps to
deepen commitment to the outcomes within those constituencies.
The cases presented in this Article each deal with state objectives
that call upon values that are widely shared by active communities of
interest. The specific policy objectives were thus amenable to pro-
gress with the full participation of non-state actors. It is probable that
other state goals that are less broadly shared would have less purchase
in the kind of deliberative international process that summits can of-
fer. Yet even where a state goal is controversial, there is reason to
believe that public access can support positive outcomes. The FTAA
case study, for example, shows that deliberative processes can yield
positive outcomes even where deep controversy exists. This Article
assesses only an initial sample and additional work is needed to deter-
mine the extent to which issue variables would advance or impede
successful outcomes in a deliberative international setting.
The Article also samples a set of case studies within a regional sys-
tem that itself has unique features. All state participants in the inter-
American summit process are nominal democracies, and while some
key actors have demonstrated less-than-democratic tendencies, this
formal feature might also lead to more positive outcomes for delibera-
tive processes. Certainly, the willingness of regional summit partici-
pants to pursue a democracy agenda, and to do so in a participatory
manner, can be tied to their shared political traditions. But it should
be recalled that the position of access critics is that increased partici-
pation in an international setting threatens the democratic values of
democratic states, so it is valid to test this claim within a community of
democracies. Certainly, as summits are studied for their broader po-
tential as deliberative mechanisms, the variables of state political sys-
tems and regional political heterogeneity will need to be separately
assessed.
No claim is made that the inter-American summits are representa-
tive of all summits, or that their process features are universal; indeed,
summits follow many forms and produce varied results. But summits
held in the Western Hemisphere do share many features in common
with other summits, making them a useful model to examine. In addi-
tion to issue and system variables discussed above, further research is
needed to determine how far claims about normative push and legi-
timization may extend beyond the inter-American experience. Even
where summit processes are less open and transparent, as many re-
gional models seem to be, the jurisgenerative potential of summits is a
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feature worth examining. While these issues are beyond the scope of
this Article, the work presented herein may help frame issues for fu-
ture research.
